


23 March 1994



FOREIGN
BROADCAST
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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-94-007

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23 March 1994

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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Defense Budget to Focus on New Generation of ICBM's

HK1203042594 Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST in English 12 Mar 94 pp 1, 7

[Article by Chris Yeung in Beijing and Willy Wo-lap Lam]

[Excerpts] Beijing has boosted its defence budget by 20 per cent in an apparent bid to expedite modernisation of weaponry.

While addressing the National People's Congress (NPC) yesterday, Finance Minister Liu Zhongli said the State Council had earmarked 52.04 billion yuan (HK\$46.2 billion) for national defence for 1994. The percentage increase this year was the highest since 1979, when patriarch Deng Xiaoping launched his economic reforms, one of whose tenets was to curtail military spending and devote more resources to the economy.

China's military outlay takes up 9.59 per cent of its total governmental expenditure, as compared with 23 per cent for Taiwan, 24.3 per cent for South Korea and 17.6 per cent for the United States. A total of 43.25 billion yuan was spent on the People's Liberation Army (PLA) last year, slightly more than the original target. About 42.5 billion yuan had been set aside for national defence in last year's budget, which represented an increase of 14.8 per cent over the 1992 figure. [passage omitted]

"The PLA is pumping funds and resources into developing nuclear-powered submarines as well as medium-range missiles that could be launched by them," a military source

said. The source added that priority was set after the top brass decided late last year to scrap the plan for building aircraft carriers.

"China's five existing nuclear submarines are old Soviet models that are terribly antiquated," the source said. "The PLA is testing a submarine-launched missile that has a range of around 400 kilometres."

Western military analysts said the PLA's Second Artillery Unit was aggressively developing medium to long-range ballistic missiles, including the Dong Fang 25 and the Dong Fang 31 models, which had ranges of respectively 1,700 km and 8,000 km.

At the same time, emphasis is being put on churning out a new generation of solid-fuel Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.

The analysts said the PLA had to spend more money developing its own weapons systems partly due to the stalemate in efforts to procure Russian military technology. They added discussions on buying another batch of SU27 jet fighters from Moscow—as well as a co-production agreement to turn out MiG aircraft on Chinese soil—had bogged down because of Russian reluctance to part with top-of-the-line know-how.

However, with the revival of military co-operation with Europe and even the United States, the top brass is again hopeful of acquiring sophisticated hardware from the Western world. "In view of the recent 30 odd per cent devaluation of the yuan, the 52.04 billion yuan budget is not much to play around with," a Beijing diplomat said.

JAPAN

MITI Official Says Cutback in Plutonium Project Under Study

OW0403094494 Tokyo KYODO in English
0831 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Tokyo, March 4 KYODO—The trade ministry is studying whether or not to back down from a planned nuclear fuel recycling project using plutonium, a senior ministry official said Friday [4 March].

He said it does not mean, however, that the ministry will surely move toward cutting the project.

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has yet to reach any conclusion on its plutonium policy as reported recently, said the official, who declined to be named.

The NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN reported Thursday that the ministry has decided to postpone full-scale use of plutonium for nuclear recycling until its economic feasibility is confirmed.

The economic daily also cited global fear for nuclear proliferation in Japan and a diminishing need for an immediate establishment of nuclear recycling amid falling uranium prices as other reasons behind Japan's review of its plutonium policy.

The trade ministry's advisory body will probably issue a proposal on the matter in its interim report in June, the official said.

Meanwhile, the MITI official confirmed a newspaper report that the ministry will assist a shift of idle petrochemical production facilities in Japan to China.

The NIHON KEIZAI said Friday the nation's petrochemical companies will transfer unused facilities to China at an ethylene equivalent of 1 million tons.

The official said MITI will shortly send a mission to China to work out details on the scheme.

MITI Official Urges Plutonium Recycling Research Slowdown

OW1703124594 Tokyo KYODO in English
1207 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Text] Tokyo, March 17 KYODO—A top-ranking Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) official on Thursday [17 March] called for a slowdown in research and development [R & D] on plutonium recycling.

This will be necessary if Japan is to allay possible suspicions that it may possess nuclear weapons in the future, said the official who wants not to be identified.

Japan is known to be ahead of other countries in R & D related to plutonium recycling.

Final Plutonium Shipment Arrives at Monju Reactor

OW0403075194 Tokyo KYODO in English
0731 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Fukui, March 4 KYODO—Somes 100 people staged a demonstration Friday [4 March] as the final shipment of plutonium fuel arrived at Japan's prototype fast-breeder reactor Monju in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture.

The reactor, operated by the governmental Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp., will soon reach criticality, the stage when a nuclear chain reaction is self-sustaining.

It will then produce 280,000 kilowatts of electricity.

Four large-scale trucks packed with 21 fuel assemblies set out Thursday afternoon from the factory in Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, where the mixture of plutonium and enriched uranium is produced.

Although the government tried to keep the transport route secret, as with previous plutonium deliveries, antinuclear groups tracked its progress along roads across Honshu to the Sea of Japan coast.

Since the first controversial plutonium shipment to Monju in July 1992, a total of 200 fuel assemblies have been delivered, including five for experimental purposes.

Monju was originally scheduled to reach criticality last October but its start-up had to be postponed due to a technical mishap in fuel production last July.

NORTH KOREA

PRC Reportedly Says Pyongyang Lacks Nuclear Capability

SK0903011494 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
9 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Kim Chung-kun from Beijing]

[Text] China has been closely analyzing North Korea's nuclear technology level during the past year since the North Korean nuclear issue became an international issue. It was learned that China ultimately concluded that North Korea had not yet reached the level of developing nuclear warheads.

A high-ranking diplomatic source in Beijing said: "After a long investigation into various aspects of the North Korean nuclear issue, China judges that North Korea's current nuclear technology is only at the level of reprocessing plutonium and that it has yet to reach the level of nuclear enrichment."

According to this source, China views that North Korea's economy limits nuclear development.

Japanese Paper Reports 1991 Explosion at Missile Plant

SK1903020094 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0105 GMT 19 Mar 94

[Text] Hatch from Seoul, SANKEI SHIMBUN reported today that a missile plant exploded in November 1991 in Kanggye city in the northern area of Chagang Province, North Korea, in which military plants are concentrated. The paper reported that approximately 200 workers were killed and a great number of homes were destroyed in the explosion.

The paper also reported that Mr. Ko Chon-song, 32, who defected to the ROK from North Korea in June last year, said this in an interview with SANKEI SHIMBUN.

Mr. Ko Chon-song said that the explosion took place at the Kanggye No. 26 General Plant, the largest underground facility in North Korea, which was built after tunneling the mountain.

He said that the explosion took place at 2130 on 30 November 1991 and that the plant had produced missiles and other various kinds of weapons, including rocket

bombs, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. He added that it had produced Hwasong-1 ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles with a range of 200 km.

SOUTH KOREA

Dailies React to Hubbard's Remarks on National Security Law

SK0303072794

[Editorial Report] On 3 March, Seoul vernacular newspapers react to Tom Hubbard, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state, who expressed the hope that the "ROK would abolish the National Security Law."

The conservative CHOSON ILBO on page 3 carries a 1,000-word editorial entitled "United States and the National Security Law."

It first says that abolishing the National Security Law is not a matter that a third country can intervene in, and adds that, unlike what he has said, the law does not exist to hinder the promotion of human rights in the ROK, and that he should have been cautious in commenting anything on the ROK because he is a leading member of the U.S. delegation to the scheduled third round of North Korea-U.S. talks. Noting the possibility that North Korea persistently raised the issue concerning the National Security Law during the recent North Korea-U.S. negotiations, the editorial suspects that in a hasty effort to make North Korea accept nuclear inspections, the United States may have agreed during its negotiations with North Korea that it would later say something about the National Security Law. The editorial then concludes: "Hubbard made such remarks at a time it has been learned there may be some conflict or disharmony between the ROK and the United States concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. Such remarks may possibly make us an 'uneasy spectator.' This is the problem."

The moderate HANGUK ILBO carries on page 3 a 1,000-word editorial entitled "True Intention of Hubbard, Who Hoped for the Abolition of the National Security Law." The editorial questions why he made such remarks at a time when North-South dialogue is about to resume. The editorial concludes that before expressing the hope that the National Security Law would be abolished, the United States should ask North Korea to "stop suppressing its people and abolish its criminal laws" which bear a resemblance to those of the Stalinist era.

The moderate CHUNGANG ILBO carries on page 3 a 1,000-word editorial entitled "What a U.S. Official Should and Should Not Say." The editorial first says that his remarks are "inappropriate" and "undesirable." The editorial even suspects that the National Security Law may have been a topic in the negotiations between the United States and North Korea. The editorial concludes: "An ROK-U.S. cooperation system must be further strengthened to prevent a similar confusion in the future."

THAILAND

Paper Cites U.S. Envoy on Thai Workers for Libya

BK1103104794 Bangkok SIAM POST in English

11 Mar 94 p 23

[Text] In a 10 March statement, United States Ambassador to Thailand David Lambertson noted that there had been no new developments following the U.S. warning six months

ago about three Thai companies supplying workers to work under the chemical weapons plant project in Rabta, Libya. He said that although the Thai Government tried to solve the problem and arrested the Thai businessmen for sending workers to Libya without official permits, there has been no change in the situation.

The three companies are: the SPC Suphachok, or SPC Supertrade; V and M Engineering; and an affiliated firm of Wintrade and Winman. The ambassador said the three will be barred from doing business with American companies.

Wirot Sakunmuthita, owner of the V and M Engineering Company, has denied the charges, but admitted designing and overseeing the construction of a "safety bunker" in a complex which the United States believes is the chemical weapons factory. Wirot said his arrest was politically motivated and carried out under U.S. pressure. He said he has cancelled all contracts to build "safety bunkers" in Libya.

Following the arrest in October of Thai businesses sending workers to Libya, Libyan Leader Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi threatened to expel Thai workers from his country. Although no concrete action was taken afterwards, hundreds of Thai workers left Libya for home. There are about 20,000 Thai workers left in Libya.

Suspected Uranium Awaits Positive Identification

BK2302074694 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English

23 Feb 94 p 1

[Text] The tin box marked "Uranium: Danger" that was seized by a Burapha Task Force unit in Aranyaprathet over a week ago is believed to be depleted Uranium 238 that was used by the U.S. Army in the Vietnam war.

A source at the Army's Scientific Department said the military always used this depleted uranium for the purpose of making armour-piercing-bullets because of its high penetration power.

He said Thai army officers had occasionally received similar items in the form of sticks from its intelligence unit but it had never come in a tin box.

The source said the department so far had not sent any officer to fetch the box to determine the type of substance it contains, but he believes it might be Uranium 238, as it was widely used by the U.S. Army.

If not, it might be parts smuggled from a small research nuclear reactor unit in Dalat, Vietnam.

A Vietnam war expert said the unit was given to the Vietnamese government during the Vietnam war for research purposes but the U.S. government took back all its equipment in 1975.

He said that the USSR donated the equipment needed to resume the operation of the small research reactor in Dalat in 1976.

He dismissed the report that the box might contain uranium since he had never seen it when he was in Vietnam during the war. He believed that it might be a joke or the work of a gang of swindlers.

Meanwhile, the Office of Atomic Energy for Peace said depleted uranium has low radioactivity and would not be a danger to anything and cannot be used to produce nuclear weapons.

ARGENTINA

Ghali Asks Menem To Sign Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

PY1603160394 Buenos Aires *LA PRENSA* in Spanish
15 Mar 94 p 2

[Excerpt] UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali yesterday requested of President Carlos Menem that Argentina and Brazil expedite their support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and also praised the Argentine Government's efforts and constant willingness to send peace-making forces to conflict regions.

Butrus-Ghali said that Argentina has become a leading country in Latin America and, despite his request, noted the efforts it has been making to ratify the nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty. Menem, in turn, promised to hold talks with Brazil to this end.

This information was disclosed by Media Communications Secretary Raul Burzaco at the conclusion of the meeting held between Menem and Butrus-Ghali at Government House. [passage omitted]

BRAZIL

President Promulgates Four-Party Nuclear Accord

PY0703211094 Sao Paulo *GAZETA MERCANTIL*
in Portuguese 2 Mar 94 p 16

[Article by Mario Helena Tachinardi]

[Text] On 25 February, President Itamar Franco promulgated the all-encompassing nuclear safeguard agreement signed in December 1991 by Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The decree's single paragraph, signed by Franco, reads: "Any modifications to the subsidiary agreements and acts that may entail the revision of this agreement, as well as any acts that, according to the terms of Article No. 49, clause No. 1, of the federal Constitution, may entail demands or burdensome commitments on the national economy will be subject to the approval of the national Congress."

This paragraph was included at the request of Senator Dirceu Carneiro (PSDB-SC [Brazilian Social Democracy Party-Santa Catarina]), who coordinated the agreement.

The agreement's main purpose is that the member states "accept the application of safeguards for all nuclear materiel used in all nuclear activities carried out within their respective territory, under their jurisdiction or their control at any site, with the sole purpose of assuring that the materiel not be used to produce nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices."

The agreement contains 98 articles and refers to the implementation of safeguards, the supply of information to the agency, inspectors' privileges and immunity, a common accounting and control system for nuclear materiel, subsidiary agreements, and the scope of inspections, among other issues.

As for the subsidiary agreements, the most polemic subject during the agreement's debate by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, the agreement states: "Considering the accounting and control system, the ABACC, the interested

member states, and the agency will reach detailed subsidiary agreements that will allow the agency to efficiently fulfill its duties specified in the current agreement."

Angra-2 Nuclear Plant Simulator Trains Foreign Technicians

PY0703211994 Sao Paulo *FOLHA DE SAO PAULO*
in Portuguese 27 Feb 94 Section 7 p 2

[Text] Although the Angra-2 nuclear plant, in Angra dos Reis (Rio de Janeiro), is not operating, its simulator is fully active and making money. Acquired as an important tool for training Brazilian technicians, the simulator reproduces all the operations and emergency situations in the control unit of a nuclear plant. To finance its upkeep and pay its operators, the simulator is being used by foreign plants and enterprises interested in training their personnel. During the past few years, professionals from various countries have come to Angra-2 for training courses using the plant's equipment and local personnel at a cost of \$30,000 per week per person. This year, the simulator will make a liquid profit of \$1.4 billion by training Argentine, Spanish, French, and German technicians. Courses are completely booked to January 1995.

Jet Nozzle Uranium Enrichment Project Cancelled

PY2003182294 Rio de Janeiro *O GLOBO* in Portuguese
19 Mar 94 p 18

[Report by George Vidor]

[Text] Brazil has dropped its project to enrich uranium through the German jet nozzle process. But not all of the nearly \$500 million invested in Nuclei's unfinished industrial facilities in Resende (RJ) [Rio de Janeiro] will be wasted. Brazilian Nuclear Industry, the group's holding company, intends to use part of the equipment to transform the imported enriched uranium into powder and then into pellets. The pellets will then be transformed into the fuel elements, which are currently made by another company branch.

In order to make this adaptation viable it will be necessary to invest an additional \$15 million in the Nuclei facilities. Only South Africa and Brazil have built installations to enrich uranium through the jet nozzle process. But the project is today considered economically unfeasible, besides having been questioned in scientific circles.

Jet nozzle technology contemplates the separation of uranium's heaviest isotopes (238) from lighter ones (235). In this process the uranium ore is made to circulate in a gaseous form (hexafluoride) through equipment operating successive cascades. The predominant uranium enriching process in the world today is called the ultracentrifuge process. In this process the machines rotate instead of the gas (uranium remains in solid state up to a temperature of 56 degrees centigrade. At higher temperatures it becomes uranium hexafluoride gas).

A proposal studied earlier was to incorporate Nuclei facilities into the Aramar project that is being built by the Navy, which developed its own ultracentrifuge technology to supply fuel to the nuclear submarine now under construction. The idea did not prosper because Nuclei was designed to produce 160,000 enriched uranium units a year (enough to supply the Angra-2 and Angra-3 power plants), while the submarine will only need 1,000 units.

PERU

Article Reports Details of Nuclear Research Center
PY1603213394 Lima EL PERUANO in Spanish
2 Mar 94 p B7

[Text] The Peruvian Institute of Nuclear Energy (IPEN) has implemented the largest national project in the field of science and technology: the construction of the Oscar Miro Quesada de la Guerra-Racso Center for Nuclear Research [Centro Nuclear de Investigaciones Oscar Miro Quesada de la Guerra-Racso].

Located 40 km north of Lima in the region known as Huarangal, the nuclear center is a small science and technology citadel where a group of professionals and technicians specialized in various subjects are developing a series of activities applying nuclear energy.

The center's most important part is its investigations reactor called RP-10 (10 megawatts of thermal power) with four radial tubes [tubos radiales] and one tangential tube [tubo tangencial]. The reactor's core contains MTR [materials-testing reactor]-type fuel with uranium enriched by 20

percent in which various samples are lowered for the production of radioisotopes, studies on the behavior of materials under neutron irradiation, neutrography [neutrografia], and diffraction and fission traces.

Another important plant component is the radioisotope production plant, which entails a series of laboratories located next to the reactor that are used for the production, quality control, and development of radioisotopes and irradiated [marcadas] molecules.

In addition to the nuclear center, IPEN has at its main headquarters in San Borja a test reactor (RP-0), a 14 MeV neutron generator, two gamma irradiators, and several laboratories engaged in projects such as the irradiation of food, isotopic hydrology [hidrologia isotopica], non-destructive tests, and gauging.

The Lima, Arequipa, and Trujillo nuclear medicine centers, which in addition to rendering routine services also carry out training, research, and development programs, are also part of IPEN's infrastructure acquired with the support and cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

INDIA

Article Views Regional Nuclear Issue, U.S. Policy

*BK2402031894 Delhi INDIAN EXPRESS in English
16 Feb 94 p 8*

[Article by Akhtar Majeed, director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Aligarh, entitled: "A Nuclear Brahmacharya"]

[Text] The joint US-Russian declaration on nuclear issues, signed last month in Moscow, is the continuation of the old Western policy advocating the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the present form. The US and Russia have called upon India and Pakistan to join a multilateral forum for arms control.

It was obvious at the time of the signing of the NPT that the spread of nuclear weapons would ultimately facilitate it for the sponsors to claim a tremendous success and advocate its extension. Flaws were pointed out by India then. It is a proof of the abject failure of the conduct of Indian diplomacy that while almost all the Indian proposals for nuclear disarmament have been subsequently accepted by the world community, the latter has now pleaded with India to accept those proposals! In South Asia, there is a situation of nuclear asymmetry, with an advanced nuclear capable China on one side and acquisition of nuclear weapon capability by Pakistan, on the other. This asymmetry is not conducive to regional stability. If strategic deterrence is to be achieved, in view of the on-going missile proliferation around India, then again, acquisition of nuclear weapon capability seems the only viable option. There is an essential universality of nuclear deterrence logic and it is as true for India and Pakistan as it was for the USA and USSR. If nuclear deterrence sustained peace in the developed world, even during the Cold War, it would sustain peace and stability in South Asia after the Cold War. The objective of the nuclear policy followed by India and Pakistan is to make certain that there is no direct nuclear threat without them being able to retaliate. During the Cold War, each had the strategic support of a superpower. Now in the absence of earlier assurances there is a need that can only be fulfilled by an overt nuclear stability in the region. Since wars in South Asia have mostly been caused by misconceptions about relative strength, there would be greater stability once such misconceptions are removed, generating the logic of deterrence peculiar to nuclear weapons.

It should be obvious to the Government of India that if it did not change its policy of nuclear abstinence, it would face a highly inimical asymmetrical predicament vis-a-vis Pakistan. In fact, our nuclear disarmament effort is a convenient and self-defeating myth. The continued nuclear brahmacharya (celibacy) of India is bound to force the rest of South Asia, China and the USA to re-evaluate their attitude towards India, and that re-evaluation would not be in our favour. If calculated meaningful ambiguity is taken for bluff then the force of deterrence is lost. The tact that the ambiguity was an emasculated one was evident from the lack of any sufficient technology effort to use any mythical "bombs in the basement" in the event of any nuclear attack by, say, Pakistan.

The very talk of 'minimum deterrence' highlights our confused perception of the dimensions of the nuclear war. Security involves the capability to absorb the full intensity of a nuclear attack and the retaliatory ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy. That is true deterrence

and it is credible only if the enemy understands, not the bland assurances that we will be able to "retaliate at short notice when the need arises." Once the nuclear status of India and Pakistan is understood and acknowledged mutual deterrence would make it possible for confidence building measures to evolve on a mutually agreed basis. After possessing a minimum deterrent capability and survivable delivery system, it would not be necessary, at least for India, to enter into a nuclear arms race. Since deterrence would be the objective, and not the accumulation of a large arsenal, a South Asian nuclear arms race would not be needed. The proposal of nuclear free South Asia is not in conformity with the prevailing realities, and what we can do is to attempt to create a nuclear weapons-safe South Asia. Mutual arms reductions and confidence building can be attempted once nuclear stability is reached in South Asia.

There is a deliberate Western policy to project an exaggerated over-nuclearised scenario in South Asia where tactical nuclear weapons are integrated even in routine military exercises. Therefore, a need to maintain 'nuclear restraint' while trying to save the situation through regional arms control measures [sentence as published]. The Seymour Hersh article, in the NEW YORKER, was one such plant about events in 1990 that supposedly almost led to a nuclear war between the two countries. But this policy has to be viewed in the light of what happened with the much-publicised Indo-Russian cryogenic engine deal. More than the concerns about non-proliferation, and potential uses of the rocket, it was a message to India that it would be impossible to operate independently of the USA as far as proliferation is concerned; and it would not be possible for the Russians to rescue India, like in the past. One flaw in this approach is the continuing and wishful habit of treating India and Pakistan at par. Any parity, if it has to be calculated at all, can only be between India and China. With the prevalence of the India-Pakistan one, formulations of the Cold War era are again dominating South Asia.

Closed-door 'clubs' and 'regimes' intending to impose unilateral sanctions and restrictions on technology in a discriminatory manner cannot prevent proliferation. Neither is this possible only through the arms-reduction approach. The Missile Technology Control Regime has not been as effective a deterrent as it is claimed. Pakistan's missile programme has not suffered, for example. As China pointed out in October 1993, "conditional moratorium designed to maintain nuclear superiority while refusing to renounce nuclear deterrence and commit ourselves to complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons is of no significance."

There has been talk that while India may not sign the NPT, it will unilaterally give an assurance to abide by its provisions. Obviously, such proposals have not taken into consideration the ineffectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency verifications as far as clandestine diversions are concerned. We know too well about Israel, South Africa, Iraq, Pakistan and North Korea.

Since the objective of our nuclear policy is no longer valid, continuation with ambivalence would serve no purpose. Merely reiterating that India would not be the first one to introduce nuclear weapons in the region cannot take the place of a definite policy option. That is possible if steps are taken to trade off costly conventional forces for nuclear capability while simultaneously pursuing regional confidence building measures. This would not only lower the risk factors but reduce the danger of the use of nuclear weapons, by design or accident.

Commentary Rejects U.S. Report on Nuclear Plants

BK2502130394 Delhi All India Radio General Overseas Service in English 1010 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Commentary by Harish N. Das: "Indian Nuclear Establishments Get Clean Chit From IAEA"]

[Text] The recent statement of Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, that nuclear establishments in India are safe is a rebuff to Columbia Broadcasting Service Network. In a 60-Minutes report a few days back, CBS had charged that India's nuclear plants are safety hazards. The CBS charge seems to be a planted story by the vested interests in the U.S. Administration to create anti-India opinion in international community to put pressure on India to sign the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]. Dr. R. Chidambaram, chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, has described the American TV story as malicious, mischievous, and a deliberate attempt to misrepresent the facts.

Dr. (Maurice Russel), assistant director general for nuclear safety of IAEA, on Tuesday rightly said that safety or the lack of it cannot be judged merely by televising or publishing a few of the good or bad points. According to IAEA, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of India is making substantial progress in implementing the required safety standards, which are comparable to internationally acceptable norms and levels. According to international regulation, the same ultimate safety goals can be achieved by different countries in different ways through systems or procedures differently adopted to suit the specific national conditions. Safety is based on an overall safety consciousness and safety culture, which have their roots not only in technical capability but also in the sociocultural makeup of a country and the openness with which safety-related issues are discussed with the media as well as national specialists and international counterparts. Dr. (Maurice), who visited various Indian nuclear installations last week, was greatly impressed by the team spirit of Indian qualified personnel in manning the activities of the plants, which contribute as essential elements toward building a healthy safety culture. Dr. (Maurice) has offered to cooperate with India in emergency safety regulations at its nuclear power plants.

In fact, the Clinton administration has of late shifted from its earlier policy and undertones of its policy are biased against India. Various officials of U.S. Administration have been issuing irresponsible statements on various aspects of Indian life, be it trade, human rights, environment, management, defense, or India's national integration. Based on half-baked truths, they have been issuing statements on India and have been trying to pose as if they are the best world preachers. Despite the vows of interest in participating in India's economic resurgence, America has been misleading the world community about India's nuclear policy. By its report on the safety conditions in the Indian nuclear installations, CBS was trying to frighten the world when it said that India's nuclear installations pose safety hazards.

The U.S. Administration has also been insisting on pursuing the proposal of keeping South Asia a nuclear-free zone in the face of India's discernible reluctance. The USA is least bothered with the existence of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in Central Asia. It is also not bothered by the continuing transfer of missile-related technology from China to Pakistan, including the shipment of Chinese M-11 missile parts to Islamabad. The USA deliberately kept its

eyes and ears closed when nuclear technology was being clandestinely stolen from USA by Pakistan. The double standard of the USA on Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has prevented India from signing the NPT so far. On the part of India, it is prudent to ignore pinpricks and statements from the U.S. officials and should not materially change its nuclear policy of utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, necessary for development requirements of the nation. [sentence as heard] The USA must realize that preventing others from acquiring nuclear capability will prove ineffective as long as it perpetuates retention of its own and others' nuclear arsenals. If the U.S. is really interested in South Asia to pull back from nuclear threshold, it should promote such a dialogue rather than exacerbate tensions by encouraging Kashmiri militancy. India's perseverance and firmness on the nuclear issue could bring this home.

IAEA Official Denies Report on Nuclear Hazards

BK0203025994 Delhi INDIAN EXPRESS in English 22 Feb 94 p 9

[Text] Bombay—Assistant Director General for Nuclear Safety, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Morris Rosen who was present at a seminar for exchange of operational safety experience of pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR's) here, said at a press conference that he had heard about the CBS 60-minute TV report on operational hazards in Indian nuclear reactors.

'I have not seen it. You have to be well aware of what's going on. You have to look at the design, operation, people involved and maintenance of the reactor'. 'In India, there is a well knit group with a lot of morale, which has worked together for long, has good experience an advantage over other countries', he said.

'In developing countries, the equipment may not be the latest but if you can adapt the machine to the given conditions, it is good enough. It is very easy to take a camera into people's homes and point out the dirt', he added.

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Dr R Chidambaram described the American television news programme as malicious, mischievous and a deliberate mis-representation of facts.

The report purports to expose ill-effects of radiation due to our reactors by focusing on some village ten miles away from the power plant. It seems a deliberate campaign to misrepresent our nuclear programme " he said.

The operational radiological exposure to workers in our reactors is within specified limits, our main objective is to reduce the collective dose, he added.

The CBS show had criticised the functioning of Indian nuclear reactors by suggesting that safety guidelines were being violated in their working.

Pakistan was conspicuous by its absence at this meeting which was expected to bring together technical experts of the six member states which operate PHWR's, namely Argentina, Canada, India, Pakistan, Romania and South Korea for an exchange of information on safety standards.

IRAN

IRGC General Says Iran Not for Nuclear Weapons

LD2302211794 Tehran IRNA in English
2027 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Text] Tehran, Feb. 23, IRNA—Major General Mohsen Rezaie in an interview with the English daily TEHRAN TIMES scoffed at Western media reports claiming Iran was for nuclear weapons.

"Political logic, morality, our own culture, and above all the situation in today's world does not allow us to have such deadly weapons."

The commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) in an interview to be published Thursday, also said that political wisdom demands us not to go for the weapons which could cause devastation for humanity.

"The eight-year-old Iraqi imposed war is proof of the real nature of our combatants who never violated the internationally recognized norms concerning wars," he added.

"That Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons ...is just a baseless rumor," Rezaie said.

Commenting on the Persian Gulf he said, the geographical situation of the waterway is such that the deep water is on Iran's side which enables the Islamic forces to keep alien warships under surveillance.

Without going into details he said that there was a plot hatched by Britain, Israel and the United States to keep regional tensions high.

"I tell my friends in the UAE to listen to my advice as Iran wants to continue friendly relations with all the sheikhdoms," he added.

On the post-war role of the IRGC, Rezaie said that the IRGC was busy with extensive construction projects in the country.

LIBYA

JANA Editor Responds To U.S. Criticism on Nuclear Weapons

LD2602223794 Tripoli Libyan Television Network in Arabic 2000 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] Anthony Lake, the assistant to the U.S. president for national security affairs, has said that the United States must work to isolate rebel states which still persist in attempting to possess weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. official defined these five states as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea.

In a commentary on this, the JANA local affairs editor said: It seems that these five states, which the U.S. official described as rebels, are the independent states which have not made their independence subject to the will of the West. What should occur is the complete elimination of all weapons of destruction from all states. If these weapons are harmful to humanity, as is the case, humanity must be saved from them. This must be applied to all states, and not by pursuing a policy of double standards.

It would be more appropriate for those who make such statements and calls to get rid of their nuclear weapons and the Israeli nuclear arsenal, which they do not only disregard but even reinforce by supporting and developing it, because

if these states which give the appearance of being keen on world peace and security did not possess weapons of mass destruction, the others would never have thought of possessing these weapons.

Libya is a peaceable state which does not possess such weapons, nor does it have the capacity to possess them. It has never considered doing so. The International Atomic Energy Agency has attested to this and commended Libya for it.

The continued accusations against Libya by western officials are a form of terrorism and blackmail.

PAKISTAN

Foreign Ministry Sees Rapprochement Signs in Talks With U.S.

BK1803085094 Hong Kong AFP in English
0836 GMT 18 Mar 94

[Text] ISLAMABAD, March 18 (AFP)—Washington is showing signs of rapprochement with Islamabad in talks on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and is reconsidering a ban on military sales to Pakistan, the Foreign Ministry said.

The talks have raised concern in New Delhi that closer relations between Washington and Islamabad could lead to an upset of the regional power equation.

A Pakistani Foreign Ministry official said here Thursday that Washington and Islamabad were engaged in "deep dialogue" on the subject of nuclear non-proliferation, a priority of U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Neither Pakistan nor traditional rival India, which exploded a nuclear device in 1974, are signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and both suspect the other of developing atomic weapons.

The ongoing U.S.-Pakistan talks coincide with reports of the willingness of the U.S. administration to partially lift a ban on military and economic aid to Pakistan which was imposed in October 1990 following fears that Islamabad had embarked on a nuclear weapons program.

The ban was implemented under provisions of the Pressler amendment, named after U.S. Senator Larry Pressler, which forbids military aid to Pakistan unless the president could certify Islamabad did not have nuclear weapons and was not trying to develop them.

But U.S. officials on Tuesday said Washington may ease the ban to enable the delivery of 71 F-16 jet fighters, which were ordered from General Dynamics but suspended when the ban took effect, in return for a "verifiable" pledge that Pakistan will halt its nuclear program.

Islamabad has already paid for 38 of the aircraft.

Delivery of the aircraft would boost Pakistan's deteriorating air force, which is equipped with some 100 Mirage jets, about 100 Chinese-made F6 and F7 aircraft and 34 F-16's.

In New Delhi, India's Air Chief Marshal S.K. Kaul was quoted Friday by The Statesman daily as saying that the "balance of power" in the region would change if Pakistan acquired the aircraft, whose long ranges enable them to carry out deep strike attacks.

"Those machines have been manufactured and are lying there. I have always maintained that they (the United

States) will find some way of overcoming the Pressler amendment," the daily quoted him as telling reporters at a news conference in Bombay.

The Indian air force chief did not spell out exactly how the military balance would be upset if Pakistan were to acquire the planes.

He however spoke about India's difficulties in upgrading its Russian-built MiG-21 planes because of Russian reluctance to part with technology information following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

His remarks followed concern expressed by Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh at the U.S. proposal to dispatch the F-16's to Pakistan, with which India has fought three wars since independence in 1947.

"Does the United States want to encourage Pakistan to use nuclear weapons against India?" Dinesh Singh said this week.

Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, shortly after assuming office in October last year, said that former premier Nawaz Sharif had "capped" the country's nuclear programme and that she had decided to maintain that position.

A late Thursday report, quoting sources close to the foreign office, reiterated Islamabad's position and assured the Pakistani public that "any step taken will safeguard the national interest."

The report also claimed that the Pressler amendment had failed to achieve its objective of preventing arms proliferation, but had managed to contribute to Pakistan's conventional arms capabilities being "eroded."

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Ukraine Suspends Nuclear Warhead Consignments to Russia

LD1103144294 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1400 GMT 11 Mar 94

[Text] According to Associated Press, Ukraine has announced that it is suspending the dispatch to Russia of nuclear warheads from missiles on its territory.

The agency cites a Ukrainian Defense Ministry statement issued on Friday. Justifying this step, the Ukrainian ministry has accused the Russian media of disseminating confidential information on the transportation of the warheads from the Ukrainian territory into Russia. This is seen by the Ukrainian military as a threat to the safety of the nuclear materials due to be transported.

It was earlier reported that the first nuclear trainload arrived in Russia last Sunday.

Withdrawal of Russian Strategic N-Arms From Belarus Assessed

PM1703104594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Mar 94 p 2

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Belorussia [Belarus] Gives Up Strategic Nuclear Systems Forever. Now Only Russia Will Have Them"]

[Text] The full-scale withdrawal from Belorussian territory to Russia of the Strategic Rocket Forces grouping temporarily stationed in the cities of Mozyr and Lida has begun. IZVESTIYA's military correspondent learned this from well-informed sources in the Russian Defense Ministry.

The Strategic Rocket Forces grouping in the Republic of Belorussia comprised two divisions (eight missile regiments) armed with the RS-12M "Topol" road-mobile missile system or, as it was called in the West, the SS-25. A total of 72 launchers.

The first regiment (nine "Topols") stationed in Postavy was withdrawn to Russia back in summer 1993. The next four regiments (36 launchers) will leave the republic in 1994 in accordance with the schedule agreed by the two states' defense ministries, and the rest in 1995. By mid-1996 the Mozyr and Lida missile divisions will have totally ceased to exist, they will be disbanded in accordance with the START Treaty.

At the same time the arms and combat hardware withdrawn from Belorussian territory will be deployed at Strategic Rocket Force bases and arsenals—they are to replace missiles and launchers that have outlived their service life in those regiments on combat alert duty on Russian territory that do not come under the START-1 and START-2 Treaties.

Our newspaper has already reported (No. 25, 9 February) that the modernized RS-12M system's standardized solid-fuel multiple-warhead missile is to be the basis of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces. Moreover the ratio between fixed-site and mobile systems will be 30-40:70-60.

Specialists have calculated that these systems and the delivery to target of their warhead will cost the country 3-5 times less than for the sea-based nuclear forces and 5-10 times less than for the air force, although they do not cancel out the two other components of the nuclear triad. At the

same time mobile launchers' survivability is 4-5 times greater than that of fixed-site launchers.

It is very hard to ascertain the location of a wheeled vehicle in a vast position area, but silo coordinates are always known. To support this idea specialists cite the example of the obsolete Iraqi Scud systems, whose launch preparations took many hours. During the Gulf War state-of-the-art U.S. reconnaissance systems, including space reconnaissance, were unable to detect them on the move and in position areas and consequently avert missile launches.

This factor, as well as many others, promises the Russian "Topols" a good future.

Incidentally, officers and warrant officers from the missile regiments being withdrawn from Belorussia and disbanded, along with the enlisted men and NCO's on compulsory military service and contract personnel, will not be discharged into the reserve. They will make up the strength of other Strategic Rocket Forces units experiencing today a considerable shortage of specialist missilemen of all kinds. I was assured at the Rocket Forces Main Staff that they have all been guaranteed the social rights and benefits extended to soldiers of the Russian Federation.

Officers and warrant officers from the regiments being withdrawn to Russia who do not want to leave Belorussia will be discharged into the reserve. They will enjoy all the rights of the citizens of the state in which they have remained to live, they and their families will keep the apartments in which they are now living, and those who have served in the army for 20 years or more will be paid a military pension in line with current legislation. At the Strategic Rocket Forces Main Staff I was assured that there has not been a single case of infringement of the legitimate rights of the Russian troops remaining in Belorussia.

Once the strategic offensive arms installations have been eliminated on Belorussian territory, the missilemen's military camps will be handed over to the republic's defense ministry and the vacated apartments to people on the military department's waiting list or to other Belorussian citizens.

Once it has given up its "Topols" Belorussia will be the only post-Soviet state to have carried out its commitments to the world community without any conditions and stipulations and to have really subscribed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a nonnuclear country.

Bizhan Denies Ukraine Impeding Russia in Servicing Nukes

LD2402182794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1812 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow February 24 TASS—Ukraine has no possibility to fully service nuclear weapons, Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan, deputy defense minister of Ukraine, told ITAR-TASS today.

According to the Ukrainian commander who is participating in a two-day meeting of the Council of Defense Ministers of the Commonwealth countries in Moscow, "Russia has assumed an obligation to carry out a guarantee and author's supervision over nuclear weapons on the Ukrainian territory, and all conditions are being created here for Russian specialists to service nuclear objects."

Commenting on the report by a representative of the Russian Defense Ministry on the impossibility to service nuclear objects on the Ukrainian territory, Ivan Bishan noted that "there are separate structures in Ukraine which do not like the normal course of resolving Russo-Ukrainian problems concerning nuclear weapons." According to the Ukrainian general, "there was not a single case of banning or impeding the servicing of nuclear weapons."

The Ukrainian deputy defense minister expressed confidence that "in the near future Ukraine will resolve with Russia the problem of the strategic nuclear aircraft which remained on the Ukrainian territory." Bilateral talks are being held on this issue, the general pointed out.

RUSSIA

Amendment to Uranium Agreement With U.S. Coordinated

LD1503101094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0519 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Vanichkin]

[Text] Washington March 15 TASS—U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown has described an amendment to the bilateral agreement on the suspension of anti-dumping inquiry into the deliveries of uranium products from Russia to the U.S. as a considerable step in trade cooperation between the two countries.

"The document envisages a joint sale of American and Russian uranium products in the U.S., and at market prices, too," Russian Deputy Minister of Nuclear Power Nikolay Yegorov, who signed the amendment for the Russian Government, told ITAR-TASS.

"According to preliminary estimates, Russia's revenue from the sale of uranium on the U.S. market may run at 150 million U.S. dollars annually. Of great importance is also the consent of U.S. uranium producers, who earlier accused our country of a desire to sell uranium products at dumping prices, to cooperate with Russia," Yegorov said.

A press release circulated here by the Russian Embassy in the U.S. points out that the amendment, agreed upon by the governments of the two countries, reflects the mutually beneficial and innovative approach to the solution of trade problems and is a new specific example of partners' relations being developed by Russia and the U.S.

Mirzayanov's Co-Author on Revealing Use of Chemical Weapons

MK1103131094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
11 Mar 94 p 2

[Lev Aleynik report under the "Security" rubric: "Lev Fedorov Unsure Russia Produces No Chemical Weapons. He Urges Investigation Into Military-Chemical Complex Activities"]

[Text] Dr. Lev Fedorov has stated that he "would not give guarantees" that Russia has totally discontinued the production of chemical weapons. These conclusions, according to co-author Vil Mirzayanov, are also suggested by the recent splash of events connected with "Mirzayanov case" and the reticence of officials unwilling to provide the public with details of the state of affairs in the military-chemical complex (MCC).

Lev Fedorov presented yesterday a report, "Chemical Weapons in Russia: History, Ecology, Politics." He stated in a press conference that "there are no forces in the government... that would regard seriously both the danger posed by the MCC, and the safety of the population. The government has not even started to solve the problems of getting rid of highly toxic dioxins; the questions we raised of elimination of liquid rocket fuel in the same class of danger as toxic substances also await consideration."

Lev Fedorov underlined that he and his colleagues "have so far received neither from the army nor industry any precise information on where and when they worked in Russia with chemical weapons. Society remains unaware of the size of the threat to our existence." In the opinion of Mr. Fedorov, people in Russia, and elsewhere in the world for that matter, "are being denied the opportunity to take an integral look at the country's military-chemical past and present: reserved for us are miserly crumbs of information. Meanwhile the MCC not only exists, but it is also totally unprepared to enter together with us into the next millennium; it cannot give up the idea that it can no longer hide the costly and highly dangerous chemical weapons toy, and that it will not be able to get a free ride on this any longer." Lev Fedorov stated that "it is necessary to campaign for the full declassification of documents once the country's leaders sign the convention renouncing chemical weapons, to look into our past and get rid of the old onus of secrets."

Defense Ministry To Organize Strategic Nuclear Forces

LD1203115694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1114 GMT 12 Mar 94

[Text] Moscow, 12 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin has signed an order instructing the Russian Defense Ministry to draw up before 30 May 1994 measures to implement the organization of the daily activities of the strategic nuclear forces with non-targeted missiles, the Russian president's press service reports.

The order has been issued for the purpose of implementing the Moscow declaration, which was signed by the Russian and U.S. Presidents on 14 January 1994, and the joint statement of the Russian president and the British prime minister on 15 February 1994.

Expert Terms Official Data on Toxins 'Very Conservative'

LD1003230094 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian
2000 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Text] Official data on chemical weapons in Russia is very conservative, thinks Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission for Ecological Safety. According to Interfax, he declared this at a news conference today. He said that in Russia there are not 40,000 tonnes of toxic substances, as officially stated, but possibly a whole order of magnitude more.

Apart from Aleksey Yablokov, the news conference was also attended by Lev Fedorov, a doctor of chemical sciences and co-author of the scientist Vil Mirzayanov, who published the well-known article Poisoned Politics (Otravleniya politika).

Roseco-Atom Offers Nuclear Reactors for SaleAU0803145494 Munich *FOCUS* in German 7 Mar 93 p 84

[Unattributed report: "Mini Reactor for All"]

[Text] At the German boat fair in Hamburg, one Russian company was unusually restrained. As a subtenant of a joint stand, "Roseco" retreated to the last row in hall number 12 and was not mentioned in the catalogue at all. For a good reason, as it now turns out: "Roseco-Atom Co, Ltd" from St. Petersburg wants to sell entire nuclear reactors discreetly.

"Our company," Roseco manager Venyamin Skvirskiy says in his office in Sestroretskaya 2 in St. Petersburg, "has permission to sell reactors and steam generators of submarines, warships, and ice-breakers to other countries"—both plans and entire facilities. Russian President Boris Yeltsin himself reportedly gave the permission—the only condition: The use must be "peaceful."

Russian military officers fear the potential sell-out of their most secret drive technologies. Already before Skvirskiy's trip to the boat fair, the Russian intelligence service told German authorities about alleged nuclear smuggling that is controlled by Skvirskiy.

When the nuclear manager arrived at Kiel on the Baltic Sea ferry "Anna Karenina," customs officers arrested him. They did not find any radioactive material—Skvirskiy was only carrying advertising brochures.

These brochures, however, were explosive: His offers include two reactors for ice-breakers with a capacity of 70 megawatts for \$100 million. Big numbers do not frighten Skvirskiy: He demands \$1 billion for 10 reactor units in relay, which yield 500 megawatts together.

Roseco also has steam generators of the new PCVS [expansion unknown] type in its program—for \$930 million. Skvirskiy does not see any safety problems: He praises the "systems of passive safety" of the reactor, which regulates "itself in line with temperature."

Thomas Schulz-Jagow, nuclear expert of Greenpeace in Hamburg, knows of already initiated negotiations between Russians and the Philippine Government about the delivery of a floating reactor unit. The contract has not yet been concluded, because the island state lacks foreign currency.

Schulz-Jagow says that the facilities' safety standard is "disastrous." In the compact reactors, there is hardly any room for safety technology.

Federal Office of Criminal Investigations [BKA]: Trade in Missiles Soon

In an internal paper, the BKA notes a skyrocketing increase in illegal nuclear trade in Germany. In 1993, 241 cases became known, in 1992 there were only 158. These cases included 118 "fraudulent offers"—cashing in without delivery or offers of non-radioactive materials (in 1992 there were 59 cases).

Weapons-grade material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) was offered but, according to the BKA, "there is no information that confirms that the persons making the offer are actually in possession of weapons-grade material."

For the future, the BKA fears a drastic increase in nuclear material, which could get into the wrong hands in the former USSR, "if the existing nuclear weapons are disassembled on the basis of the disarmament treaties."

The summary of the investigators: "The situation is not improving regarding crimes in this field."

Defense Ministry Substantiates Chemical Arms DestructionLD2602115394 Moscow *ITAR-TASS* in English
0804 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunaiskiy]

[Text] Moscow February 26 TA. —The Russian Defence Ministry is preparing an adequate substantiation for a Russian programme to destroy chemical weapons.

Commenting on aspects of this programme in Saturday's issue of the *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* newspaper, Chief of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces Mikhail Kolesnikov noted that the Russian Defence Ministry is the state customer of work on the development of ecologically safe technologies for the destruction (utilisation) of chemical weapons.

According to the general, the Defence Ministry uses the principles of openness to choose adequate technologies, discusses, together with representatives from various regions, sections of the draft programme which are of interest to them.

The ministry actively helps the mass media and scientific publications in describing various aspects of chemical weapons' destruction. "The time of taking "hush-hush" decisions has gone long ago," the general staff chief stressed.

According to Kolesnikov, the production of chemical weapons in the former Soviet Union was discontinued in 1987 and has never been resumed. Their stockpiles were not replenished and not updated.

He stressed that the stockpiles of chemical weapons in Russia are under 40,000 tonnes by weight of toxic agents and are housed at seven arsenals specially equipped for their safe and reliable storage.

Russia will carry out the destruction of chemical weapons only at specially built facilities, the location of which will be determined by a government commission set up by the Russian president's decision of August 9, 1993, Kolesnikov continued.

In the general's opinion, "the safety of population and environment is the guiding condition for destruction." For this purpose, the Defence Ministry closely cooperates with regional and republican supervision bodies to conduct monitoring of public health and to take samples from surrounding terrain.

Such work has already been done near the city of Kam-barkiy (Udmurtia), in the Krasnopartizanskiy (Gornyy village) and Volskiy (Shikhaniy village) districts of the Saratov region.

Skilled medics are invited to participate in this work. The results of population's medical checkups are reported to regions where this work is done.

New Cosmodrome To Operate in Place of Missile Division

*LD1803095794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0825 GMT 18 Mar 94*

[Report by ITAR-TASS special correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Svobodnyi-18 (Amursk region) March 18 TASS—"The state will pay virtually nothing to create the Svobodnyi cosmodrome in the Russian Far East," Major-General Aleksandr Venedikov, chief of the main centre for testing and application of space technologies (Svobodnyi cosmodrome) said in an interview with ITAR-TASS on Friday.

"There are enough missile silos and infrastructure left by a missile division which operated here, to start space explorations," he added. Besides, many servicemen and missile specialists will remain at the cosmodrome to work, he noted.

Venedikov sees his main task in preparing the cosmodrome for operations and in providing it with adequate equipment.

The reduction of the missile division which was on duty in Svobodnyi-18, started in 1992 under the START II Treaty. The last regiment was released from duty here less than a month ago.

The cosmodrome needs twice the number of commissioned officers now, but the new tasks have to be tackled with the present personnel. Venedikov hopes that new specialists will come here, including graduates from the Mozhayskiy Military Space Engineering Academy.

Retired Nuclear Submarine Sinks in Vladivostok Bay
OW2702075594 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 0300 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Announcer-read report over video; from "NHK News" program]

[Text] It has been disclosed that a retired Russian Pacific Fleet nuclear submarine sank near a wharf in a port on the outskirts of Vladivostok in mid-February. Although there is no nuclear fuel aboard the submarine, it is equipped with nuclear reactors. As a result, there are fears about the danger of radiation pollution in the surrounding seas.

According to information given to NHK by concerned people in Moscow and Vladivostok, it is a November-class retired nuclear submarine, which was commissioned during the 1960's and belongs to the Russian Pacific Fleet. In mid-February the submarine sank in water three meters deep near a wharf, where it was anchored, at a ship-repair yard in Tajima Bay [as heard], which is located in eastern part of Vladivostok. The site of the accident is now covered with thick ice. All that is visible of the submarine is its conning tower. The submarine is supported all round by ice so there is currently no danger of it tipping sideways.

There is no nuclear fuel aboard the aging submarine, which was waiting to be scrapped. However, it is still equipped with two nuclear reactors. As a result, concerned people say there is a danger the surrounding seas may become polluted with radiation when the ice starts to melt and the submarine tips sideways allowing water to enter the reactors.

Eight years ago there was an accident, dubbed Chernobyl, in Tajima Bay in the Maritime Kray in which a submarine sank and a large quantity of radiation leaked. There was reportedly an explosion in one of the nuclear submarine's reactors during work to replace nuclear fuel rods.

Mafia Said to Lack Access to Nuclear Material

*LD1003114994 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
2324 GMT 9 Mar 94*

[Excerpt] Bonn (DDP/ADN)—According to Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND) the Russian mafia has no access to former Soviet nuclear plants or weapons-grade nuclear material. BND director Konrad Porzner told (the Thursday edition of) the HANNOVERSCHE ALLEMEINE ZEITUNG that there was no indication that countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons had had any success in recruiting Russian nuclear weapons experts.

"Nuclear smuggling from the former Soviet Union is not as widespread as portrayed in the media. As far as we are aware there is on the black market no material available for nuclear weapons construction, either in terms of type or volume," Porzner stressed during the interview. "It can be said with more or less certainty that the atomic arsenal is under the control of the armed forces there. We have no knowledge that the Russian mafia has any influence on nuclear facilities."

Nuclear weapons were still sought after by other countries, Porzner said, and cited North Korea by way of example. However, Iran "is clearly striving for nuclear weapons" as well. Iran was already capable of manufacturing chemical weapons, he said. The German Government stopped nuclear cooperation with Iran years ago.

According to security service information, there is still a threat to the states from worldwide organized crime. "The threat has been recognized but not banished," said Porzner. The 3,000 or so gangs in the Russian mafia had no access to nuclear material, "but there is no doubt that their influence reaches into administrative structures and authorities." [passage omitted]

Nizhniy Novgorod Police Intercept Polonium Shipment

PM1503084594 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 94 p 8

[Nikolay Yefimovich report: "Radioactive Train"]

[Text] Several containers of Polonium-210 have been seized from the transport network by staffers of the Volga-Vyatka Internal Affairs Administration. The newspaper NIŽHEGORODSKIYE NOVOSTI reports that the unusual contraband had been despatched from Arzamas-16 to sovereign Kiev for use in X-ray machines. But the investigation will show whether this was actually the case.

The containers of dangerous radioactive polonium-210 had crossed virtually all of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast from south to north. And they were coupled to a...passenger train. The cost to the passengers of this little journey is as yet unknown.

Scientists Design New 'Safe' Nuclear Reactor

*LD2702164694 Moscow Radio Rossiya Network in Russian
1500 GMT 26 Feb 94*

[Text] It looks as if the world's nuclear power engineers will soon have a safe reactor for power stations. The new reactor design has been put forward by Russian scientists. I interviewed Academician Nikolay Basov, scientific head of research and a Nobel prizewinner. [begin recording]

Basov: At present we have nuclear power engineering, and work is under way to create thermonuclear power engineering. There has been great success in this respect with laser thermonuclear fusion, which was proposed by our institute. Today we are on the verge of the so-called break-even, that is, when the energy of laser light will be equal to the energy of a thermonuclear explosion. This is the first stage in the development of thermonuclear energy. In order to obtain energy, we have to have a positive yield of energy, that is the reactor must have an amplification factor greater than one. We estimate it at a hundred or several hundred times more than the laser energy. When that is the case we succeed in closing the cycle and we have a thermonuclear reactor.

Why do we need a thermonuclear reactor? Well, oil and gas are running out, but thermonuclear power engineering—lithium, from which one can obtain tritium and deuterium, is in effect an infinite sea of energy. We believe that there is enough energy here to last tens of thousands of years at least.

Announcer: The new reactor is called a hybrid reactor, since its system unites nuclear and thermonuclear subsystems. The times have compelled physicists to use this combination in their work. As a result of disarmament and the decline in research connected with the nuclear energy program large quantities of uranium and plutonium have accumulated, and these can be used successfully in the new reactor. In this system, a laser will act as a source of high intensity neutrons.

Basov: In this case, the energy of the laser is approximately 100 times less than the energy needed for a thermonuclear reactor. With the help of neutrons obtained from a thermonuclear explosion, we can try to ignite normal uranium—not uranium 235—natural uranium, or compound uranium. In that case we obtain a very beneficial reactor because it can be kept in a subcritical state, in which thermonuclear explosions of the Chernobyl type are impossible, and that is an extremely attractive prospect. The other attractive thing is that in this instance there is also a significant burnup of uranium. Whereas in normal reactors this is 0.5 percent, here one can expect a burnup of up to 5 percent, that is what we expect from the initial stations, and perhaps in subsequent ones it will reach 50 percent. That is, radioactive chemistry will clearly not be required.

That is the principle of this hybrid reactor. There is a great deal of natural compound uranium 238. Today's power engineers already have enough to last for a thousand years, or it can be obtained. In that sense one is getting a very attractive form of power engineering. It is the first step, if you like, of thermonuclear power engineering, and that is what we are doing.

Announcer: What stage is the work at now?

Basov: A program has been created. It has been approved by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, and it will be examined by top official circles in the near future. It has been approved by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences and by the institute. It has been approved by the international community. I gave a report at Livermore; I also gave a report in Japan and in a whole range of other countries, and it looks as if we will be cooperating with America, France, Japan, and maybe with other countries. We think that in some time we will manage to hold a conference of the Geneva type to resolve the issue of how to develop this kind of power engineering on an international scale. [end recording]

Nuclear Agency Chief Views Safety Issues, Uranium Thefts

AU2502212194 Hamburg *DIE WOCHE* in German
24 Feb 94 p 16

[Interview with Yuriy Rogoshin, information chief of the Russian Nuclear Inspection Agency, by Olga Sitnikova; place and date not given: "How About a Bomb?"]

[Text] **Sitnikova:** According to a report prepared by the Russian Nuclear Inspection Agency, there were 20,000 violations of safety regulations in nuclear facilities last year. When will there be a danger of another maximum credible accident a la Chernobyl?

Rogoshin: The 20,000 incidents included a number of serious violations that led to the shutting down of entire blocks in nuclear plants, but also included very many minor administrative mistakes. Most of the facilities that had to suspend operations have resumed working. However, there were a few facilities that had to be closed once and for all. For example, there were the two reactors at Krasnoyarsk 26, which produced plutonium for nuclear weapons. Their operation violated all environmental and safety norms: They were cooled with water from the Yenisey, which was then released back into the river without going through any kind of purification process. As a result of this practice, the entire river has suffered serious environmental damage. We have also reduced the operation of the IR-8 research reactor at the Moscow Institute for Energy and Technology to a minimum. The institute lacks enough supervisory personnel to guarantee that the reactor functions safely. The shortage of specialists is becoming an increasingly serious problem.

Sitnikova: According to your report, safety regulations are disregarded by every fifth employee. Why is that so?

Rogoshin: The causes are primarily economic. The highly qualified specialists who work in "secret nuclear towns" earn less than the cleaning women who work for the Moscow subway. That is why fewer and fewer young people want to complete the complicated and lengthy training. Personnel are becoming less and less motivated. Over the past few months, their salaries have only been paid out with lengthy delays. To put it simply and bluntly, they feel humiliated. However, nuclear power stations lack money in every area: There is even a shortage of new fuel elements. Some power stations have only enough reserves to last a few weeks. Half of Russia's new nuclear power stations are operating at half their capacity to avoid shutting down because of a lack of fuel elements. Can one talk about raising safety standards under these conditions? No, that is impossible.

Sitnikova: Which nuclear facilities do you consider to be particularly dangerous?

Rogoshin: Safety at nuclear power stations is not the main problem. Following the Chernobyl catastrophe, nuclear power stations attracted particular attention from the public and government. However, the situation is much worse at other facilities: uranium mines, facilities for enriching uranium, plants producing nuclear weapons, storage facilities for nuclear waste. For a long time, no one bothered about these facilities. Many of the facilities come under the authority of the Defense Ministry and there were never any state inspections. Today, however, these are the very facilities where the most violations occur as well as the most dangerous violations. The risk to the population and the environment is growing.

Sitnikova: However, the Defense Ministry is reluctant to allow the authorities to inspect those facilities.

Rogoshin: The Defense Ministry is sabotaging the decrees issued by the Russian president. In accordance with those decrees, our agency is responsible for overseeing nuclear facilities throughout the entire country irrespective of the ministry that they come under. The situation is completely absurd, after all, the president is also the commander in chief of the Armed Forces.

Sitnikova: Is there any reliable information on the military complex at all?

Rogoshin: Yes, many of our experts previously served in the Armed Forces, and some even held the rank of admiral and general. They know very well how serious the situation is. In the past, the Navy came some way to meeting our requests, and we were permitted to take part in their inspections. However, after we had criticized safety standards on a few occasions, we were excluded. Today, we receive some information through personal channels. Officially, however, we are denied entry to military bases. On the basis of what we know, the safety risks are particularly high at those facilities where nuclear weapons are stored.

Sitnikova: There are more and more reports in Russia about radioactive substances being stolen. How great is the danger that nuclear warheads will also begin to disappear shortly?

Rogoshin: I think that we Russians are capable of everything, and that, unfortunately, also includes the theft of nuclear weapons. That is why for a long time now we have been calling for a uniform system of state supervision of all strategic facilities in the country. Once again, the military does not want to go along with that. On the other hand, in the civilian field, an agency was recently formed to oversee nuclear power stations. I hope that will at least rule out serious thefts of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium. As for the press reports, those are mainly about the theft of beryllium, zirconium, and slightly enriched uranium. Even if one had the appropriate technology, it would not be possible to build a nuclear weapon using those elements.

Sitnikova: Can you rule out the possibility that there are enough highly-enriched materials on the Russian black market for the production of a bomb?

Rogoshin: I cannot rule out anything. Three containers of highly-enriched uranium, which was intended for use in submarine reactors, have disappeared from the North Sea Fleet base. That would suffice for the construction of a bomb. We cannot establish what has happened to the containers.

Sitnikova: What dangers are posed by the recruitment of Russian scientists by nuclear threshold countries?

Rogoshin: There are serious dangers. We are not only talking about specialists from secret nuclear towns. Every highly qualified physicist who has worked in a nuclear facility knows how to build a bomb. Everything else is only a question of fissionable material and the appropriate technology.

Conference Addresses Problems of Nuclear Weapons Storage

LD2302135794 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Video report by correspondent V. Lavrushenko, including recorded remarks by A. Zhokin, deputy chief of GosAtomNadzor; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Lavrushenko: The production of nuclear weapons still remains a very well-kept secret—not only for the uninformed population, but also for the federal radiation safety control bodies. The All-Russia Conference of GosAtomNadzor [State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety] that was held in Novosibirsk stated this fact with alarm. Now the regions that produce nuclear weapons have the added problem of storing radioactive materials that have been taken out of service. It is proposed to set up one of the storage depots in Tomsk-7.

Zhokin: It must, naturally, be stored in a dismantled state, and it must further be regenerated and processed once again in the place where it was produced. There are no other places; they do not exist.

Lavrushenko: This is regarded as an unconvincing argument by the population of areas where bombs have been assembled for many years without the population's knowledge, and where—on the basis of this argument—unexploded bombs will now be stored again for many generations, even though the military and the Ministry of Atomic Energy are trying to win the Tomsk and Siberian residents' agreement by offering large sums of money.

The explosion in Tomsk-7 last year was a much more convincing argument.

ARMENIA

Country Pledges Not To Use Nuclear Power for Military Aims

NC1703211494 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1800 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Text] The Russian and Armenian governments signed an agreement in Moscow today on the demobilization and industrial repair of the Armenian nuclear power plant [ANPP].

According to the signed agreement, the sides will jointly inspect the basic equipment of ANPP, [words indistinct], restore its operations up to the trial stage, and implement additional safety measures. Joint work will also be carried out to bring the plant to the start-up level, and to train the technical staff.

The Russian side is carrying out the engineering-technical work to prepare the ANPP for renewed operation and industrial use, and is supplying the nuclear fuel. It is also helping set up orga., that will supervise the operation, organization and nuclear radiation safety at the ANPP; structures that would supervise the organization of nuclear power production in Armenia; and an appropriate system to control and account for the nuclear material. It is also drawing up formal and technical documents.

The Armenian side will adopt the Russian Federation's regulations and laws on nuclear plant safety. It will assume responsibility for the physical protection of the Armenian nuclear plant.

The agreement also envisages a number of other points: Specifically, the sides will not impose custom duties on (?equipment) and goods needed for the demothballing and the industrial restoral of the ANPP, and will ensure unimpeded travel for the specialists working in the plant and for their families.

The Armenian side guaranteed that the nuclear material it receives and the nuclear and non-nuclear materials derived from it or produced from its use, and the apparatus and equipment it obtains will not be used for the production of the nuclear arms or other nuclear explosive devises, or for any other military purposes.

The Russian Federation's Atomic Energy Ministry, and Russian Supervisory Board for Nuclear Radiation Safety, the Armenian Fuel and Energy Ministry, and the Armenian Council of Minister's State Directorate for the Supervision of Nuclear Energy will be responsible for the implementation of the agreement.

The Agreement was signed by Armenian Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan and the Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets.

Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Vigen Chitechyan; Eduard Yegoryan, a member of the Armenian Supreme Council Presidium; the Armenian permanent representative in Russia Feliks Mamikonyan, and other officials were present at the signing ceremony.

In reply to reporters' questions after the signing ceremony, Grant Bagratyan and Oleg Soskovets highly assessed the significance of the agreement in strengthening and broadening the economic ties between the CIS countries, particularly between Armenia and Russia.

The Armenian prime minister described the agreement as a major step toward solving Armenia's energy problems.

Reported Plan To Burn Nuclear Waste Refuted

NC0403220494 Yerevan SNARK in English
1503 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Yerevan, March 4. (SNARK)—Levon Zurabyan, the acting press-secretary of the Armenia's president, refuted today information of some mass media that Armenia "is going to use the Azerbaijani territory occupied by Karabakh for burning radioactive waste of the Armenian nuclear power station." He called these rumors a propaganda trick.

In the interview to the SNARK reporter, Mr. Zurabyan expressed an opinion that such rumors are spread out in order to prevent renewing of the Armenian nuclear power station's work and thereby not to allow Armenia to have an independent energy source.

Meanwhile, as he pointed out, by spreading out, Azerbaijan makes a vain attempt to prove that Armenia infringes on the Azerbaijan's territory and even is going to use it for [its] own purposes.

Mr. Zurabyan said that absurdity of these statements is obvious.

Armed Forces Said To Use Poisonous Chemicals In Weapons

NC2302205394 Baku TURAN in English
1909 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Text] Baku (February 23) TURAN—During the last year Armed Forces of Armenia have used missiles, stuffed with

poisonous chemical substances against peaceful population and National Army of Azerbaijan 38 times, National Television of Azerbaijan reported, quoting Agdam headquarter of civil defense.

Laboratory examination showed that this chemical substances are mustard gas and cyanics [as received]. Intensive isolation of substances of white color take place after the exposure. When the stuff of these missiles gets on the skin, the blood poisoning takes place and people immediately die. Armed Forces of Armenia actively use missiles stuffed with chemical substances during the recent offensive in the north Karabakh.

KYRGYZSTAN

Scientific Center to Monitor China's Lop Nor Nuclear Range

LD1003172294 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian
1200 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Text] The laboratory of atmospheric processes of the Kyrgyzstan Academy of Sciences' Physics Institute has been tasked with monitoring the effects of activity at the Chinese Lop Nor nuclear testing range on the neighboring territories in Kyrgyzstan.

A RIA correspondent has learned at the government press service that an agreement to this effect was signed today between the Academy of Sciences and the republican government's State Commission for Emergency Situations and Civil Defense.

LATVIA

'Growing' Trade in Radioactive Metals Detailed

WS0803093094 Riga DIENA in Latvian 24 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by Janis Domburs: "The Black Market in Radioactive Material is Expanding"]

[Excerpts] There is no evidence either to prove or disprove reports that caesium and rubidium purchased by Rimmelle and Eichler [not further identified] were brought to Latvia before being transported to Cloten airport in Switzerland. Nonetheless, before this event even occurred, police and special services in West Europe had begun to pay attention to the fact that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the trade in contraband radioactive material from the East has grown considerably. Latvia has no choice—it is situated directly between the global powers of East and West. Is it inevitable that it should become a transit corridor for such contraband?

"Last year, even INTERPOL became anxious over the trade in radioactive metals; principally, Germany. Now reunited with East Germany, the Germans are evidently aware, better than anyone else, that these materials were available to the special services which were linked throughout East Europe. And these relations are still vivid..." this is how Juris Jasinkovics, head of Latvia's national bureau of the international police organization INTERPOL, sums up the situation. Thus far, his bureau has not been tasked by his colleagues in other countries to investigate possible trade in radioactive metals here in Latvia. Over the last half a year, only one concrete case has been uncovered. The inquiry, which came from Germany, was connected with a car which was stopped at the German-Polish border while trying to return after delivering a load of so-called colored metals to

Germany; border police detected radioactive traces in the car. In this case, the only link to Latvia was the fact that the car turned out to be the property of a Latvian company. In the export of these so-called colored metals, Latvia had been the transit country—the load was delivered from Russia through Belarus. The reason for the radioactive traces remains unexplained, because German police had not been able to find where the load had been delivered.

The fact that a special working group on trade in radioactive metals was established by the Ministry of Home Affairs in January, is evidence that the significance of the problem is actually growing. INTERPOL has organized two international conferences on criminal activity linked with environmental pollution and illegal trade in radioactive material. Copies of the reports are in the possession of the Latvian bureau and they reveal that at the last such meeting held in Lyons in September, it was the German representative who expressed extreme anxiety over the sharp increase in the number of such crimes in Germany. At the same time, he drew attention to the fact that in cases where the presence of radioactive elements was suspected, radioactivity was actually detected in relatively few instances (in 1992—18 out of 158 inspections). He stated that material often touted as radioactive, is in being sold by taking advantage of prospect buyer's credulity. Among every case when radioactivity was actually detected, there has not been a single case of material being discovered which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons, which is the most dreaded scenario. In reports delivered at INTERPOL conferences, "Red Mercury," as an example, is most often mentioned. As DIENA has already reported, citing German press reports, this was the material Johann Rimmeli supposedly had been planning to buy in China. There are different opinions concerning its usage. INTERPOL experts are of the opinion that "Red Mercury" is a material which can be used as an element in making detonators for plutonium-based bombs. The German and Dutch representatives at INTERPOL directed attention toward Russia as a source of the trade in dangerous materials. The Dutch representative emphasized the participation of former Red Army officers—it is understood that they are cheating, by selling relatively useless goods as strategic material. [passage omitted]

Dzintars Kalnins is the head engineer of the Center for Nuclear Research at the Latvian Academy of Science in Salaspils—an institution where Latvia's most highly qualified specialists in this field are working. Therefore, the explanations and comments of Dz. Kalnins can evidently be treated as the opinion of a Latvian expert.

First of all, it should be stated precisely that the valuable materials involved in the famous Lake Constance episode were not simply rare metals, but enriched isotopes. They are made by growing them in a crystal reticle. Isotopes are applied in precise technologies, in radio electronics, computer techniques, etc., where the respective isotopes—perfect, precise atom crystals—are necessary. In Latvia, such isotopes are not being manufactured, due to lack of necessary equipment. As Mr. Kalnins told us, the institutes which possess the special equipment needed to enrich these elements are situated near Moscow. "These institutes are practically under military management—so it was during the time of the Soviet Union, and so it is now, that in the field of exact sciences, at least in this branch, the military line is being developed in the first order"—he said. [passage omitted]

To the question of what amount of rare metal contraband there is in Latvia and if there are inspection facilities to

detect radioactive material at the border, the answer of the expert was skeptical—he allows for the fact that customs officers, for the sake of financial benefit or due to a lack of knowledge, often "turn a blind eye." Also, they do not have adequate equipment to detect radioactive shipments. Naturally, at the airport any isotope—radioactive or otherwise—would be discovered by a common detector, since it is a metal... Nevertheless, the situation in radioactive control is hopeful—at the Center for Nuclear Research there is a laboratory being established, where the certification and attestation of radioactivity detecting devices will be possible. There are also plans to organize training for customs officers and border guards in this laboratory. Judging by what Dz. Kalnins said, customs officers and border guards are not the only ones having problems: Recently, some kind of "mafiosi" called me and, not revealing their names, offered me a great amount of money to check the radioactivity of some metal in their possession. I replied that I do not make deals with anonymous people...

A rhetorical question could be put as to whether it would not be in Russia's interests if there were strict controls over the export of isotopes?

"Of course, and I am sure they would do it gladly, but I suppose that the Mafia has grabbed it in her hands"—answered Dzintars Kalnins.

To be continued...

More on Isotope Traffic; Finnish Deal Outlined

WS0803110094 Riga DIENA in Latvian 26 Feb 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Janis Domburs: "Does Voldemars Selga Surpass Those Who Vanished in Lake Constance?"]

[Excerpts] Western security services are linking the trade in radioactive and nuclear materials with threats to international security. However, big money apparently can also be earned by dealing with nonradioactive isotopes, prices for which on the black market often are no lower and sometimes even higher than those for radioactive ones. The deal that Rimmeli and Eichler [not further identified] concluded in Riga was valued at \$2 million. Nevertheless, even this seems to be nothing in comparison with the sums with which Voldemars Selga, a well-known business man in Latvia, is operating in deals concerning rare metals.

The document, which can be seen in the picture [published in English and Latvian next to the article and reported below], dated 3 February of this year, is called, literally translated, "Usage of bank guarantees of the Reconstruction and Development Bank [RDB] of Latvia for buying osmium." The text refers to an already received [two last words underlined] guarantee from RDB for \$4,555,000,000 (! - J.D.) for the Finnish company "Wimco-Erica Finland Ltd" to purchase osm-187, and contains a requirement to confirm the right to use this guarantee to buy 32.9 kg of osm-187 in Russia. The RDB board president and owner of the control package is Voldemars Selga.

There are also materials in which the Finnish side confirms that the purchasing of osm has already begun. Actually, it must have started before one of the signatories, visible in the picture, began to talk about seeking—even with the assistance of INTERPOL—V. Selga's partner, RDB Vice President Andrejs Zagars, on suspicion of fraud...

The fax visible in the picture did not reach its intended recipient, and this explains why V. Selga's signature is not on the document. The sources of the above mentioned

information are not sufficient to provide a precise description of the deal. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt about such guarantees by the bank. According to the initial capital and capital stock, amounting to several hundred thousand lats, RDB only ranks somewhere in the top 40 or 50 commercial banks in Latvia, and it should not have the right to give a guarantee for a million dollars, let alone any figure in the billions.

Suspicion also arose over the fact that the mentioned quantity of osm—33 kg—is too big. Experts in Germany, commenting on the plans of Rimmelle and Eichler to buy only 6 kg of osm-187 in China, acknowledged that demand for this material is measured in milligrams...

We do not have any more detailed information about the Finnish role. This cannot be said about possibilities to describe the personality of V. Selga. In 1984, during the era of the Soviet Union, he was sentenced to prison for fraud and falsification. Is Selga a crook? This was the question that arose in September 1992, when he was arrested on suspicion of cheating in a deal with the confectionery firm "Uzvara." V. Selga's background in the highest political circles could be observed when he was released from jail thanks to Latvian Supreme Council Deputies V. Kalnberzs and V. Steins, who posted bail for him. After all, he did not deliver the promised sugar for "Uzvara," but the money he had accepted in advance—50 million Latvian rubles—he only returned a few months later. [passage omitted]

These operations with the participation of Voldemars Selga, together with the Lake Constance story, provide food for thought—what is the nature of the environment in which the trade in isotopes in Latvia is occurring? Shady. The house of Victor Balulis on Sarma Street, where Eichler was kept after his capture, is undoubtedly connected to criminal circles. After his return from prison—in the second half of the 1980's, when the cooperative movement began—V. Selga was connected with these circles. Viktors Abakumovs and Aleksandrs Kisels, well-known people in the criminal world, were employees of his in the "Merkurijs" joint stock company. The first was murdered in the fall of 1991, the second was arrested for the second time last autumn and confronted with charges of blackmail. Today, it would be out-of-fashion to call them bandits, as they are all businessmen, doing legal business. However, it can be done in various ways—deals can be fair or shabby, and taxes can be paid or ignored...

In the West, the deals with rare metals are being watched by special services and by police, looking for evidence of cheating or blackmail, as well as by financial experts, who look for possible instances of "money laundering." In Latvia, minimal attention is paid to these problems and there are practically no chances for controls of any type. How can grams of anything be detected, if there are tons of sugar and flour being smuggled over the Latvian border? Still, a few grams of isotopes are far more valuable than several tons of sugar... Who has ever heard of any Latvian special services stating that they are in possession of some information in this respect, for instance regarding the production and trade control of isotopes in Russia? The story of Rimmelle and Eichler provided sufficient grounds to begin speaking about it, but it seems that while quarreling with each other, there is no time left for such things. Can we speak about narrowing down the possibilities to "launder" money? Probably not, especially since, to date, any attempts by tax inspectors to control cash transactions have remained in the realm of dreams.

The dangerous thing is that trade in nonradioactive materials can not be discerned from trade in radioactive materials, which are hazardous for human health and life, because both come from the same delivery sources. In a secret report by the German Federal Intelligence Service on the black market of radioactive materials and the threat of radioactive terrorism from the East, Kaunas and Vilnius had been mentioned as centers of illegal trade. Anyhow, this may be little consolation for Latvia. Trading will continue in places where there are few hindrances to businessmen.

[Published in a box accompanying the article is a copy of a letter in English dated 3 February from the Finnish firm Wimco-Erica Finland to RDB President Voldemars Selga, reading:

"Dear Mr. Selga,

"Reconstruction and Development Bank of has issued A Bank Guarantee No. 4008/KN/AZ/1s, with a value of USD 4,555,000,000 [previous amount circled] (Four Billion Five Hundred Fifty-Five Million). This Bank Guarantee has been issued for the benefit of Wimco-Erica Finland for buying Osmium-187.

"We have an offer to buy 32.9 kilograms of Osmium-187 in a favourable price for USD 64,450 per one gram. The value of the transaction is USD 2,120,405,000. As agreed with you and Mr. Horst Hamm, Wimco-Erica Finland will pay royalty USD 300 for each gram sold. Your bank shall get royalty USD 9.87 millions from this delivery.

"We ask you to accept Wimco-Erica Finland to use now this Bank Guarantee to buy Osmium-187 from Russia.

"GENCAR LTD., our marketing partner for Osmium trade. [previous sentence underlined]

"Marketing of this Osmium has been arranged in cooperation with Gencar Limited, a company managed by Mr. Kyoesti Lallukka, who is also a Member of Directors in Wimco-Erica Finland."

The letter is signed by Horst Hamm, "chairman of the Board of Directors of Wimco-Erica Finland," and Kyoesti Lallukka, "managing director" of Gencar Ltd.; there is place for RDB President Voldemars Selga to sign, but his signature does not appear.]

UKRAINE

START Provisions Discussed. Dependence on Nuclear Weapons Denied

94UM0265B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
5 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Serhiy Zhurets: "Nuclear Weapons for Ukraine Are Like a Suitcase for a Drowning Man—Both Too Heavy to Hold, and a Pity to Let Go"]

[Text] That which we have long been waiting for has come. The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine has finally decided to define its attitude toward the trilateral declaration of the presidents of Ukraine, the United States and Russia. As official sources have indicated more than once, this document proclaims the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and defines the mechanism for compensation and security guarantees for our nation.

All of the nuclear warheads, according to the trilateral declaration, will be removed from the territory of Ukraine

to Russia for their subsequent dismantling in the shortest possible time. Russia will provide compensation in the form of deliveries of fuel rods for the requirements of Ukrainian nuclear power engineering.

Ukraine will provide for the destruction of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive weapons, deployed on its territory within seven years, and all of the SS-24 missiles will be deactivated within ten months through the removal of their nuclear charges.

Russia will in turn guarantee the technical servicing and safe operation of the nuclear warheads. The United States will provide technical and financial assistance for the reliable and safe dismantling of the nuclear weapons.

Everything that is contained in the trilateral declaration and the addendum to the declaration, from the point of view of President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, conforms to the requirements posed by the Supreme Soviet regarding ratification of the START-1 treaty and satisfies the restrictions advanced by the people's deputies. There were 13 such restrictions, and they talked chiefly about the aforementioned security guarantees and the granting of financial and technical assistance directed toward the elimination of the nuclear arsenal.

Life has confirmed once again, however, that there are as many ideas as there are people. And when we are talking about politicians, then they could have even more.

There were meetings the day before the recent session of the Supreme Soviet by the commissions on questions of defense and national security, questions of legislation and legality, foreign affairs and the working deputies' commission to study the START-1 treaty. The aim of the session was to prepare findings regarding the conformity of the trilateral declaration signed on January 14 in Moscow. Since there was not a quorum at the session, they did not come to any unified findings, but each commission came to its own findings separately. Since it would be out of place to cite those findings, we will address the results of the working commission to study the START-1 treaty.

According to the statement by President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, the members of that commission indicate, he has confirmed his "commitment to the fact that Ukraine join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NNPT] as a state not possessing nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time." The Supreme Soviet, at the same time, had earlier considered Ukraine to be the possessor of nuclear weapons, and only the realization of START-1 "would open up the way for the resolution by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine of the question of joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

Another detail is connected with the fact that the trilateral declaration indicates that "Ukraine will provide for the destruction of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive weapons, deployed on its territory," even though the Supreme Soviet has stipulated the destruction of only 36 percent of the missile delivery systems and 42 percent of the nuclear warheads. Moreover, this presidential wording obligates Ukraine to destroy not only all nuclear weapons within seven years, but also all strategic offensive weapons along with their infrastructure. After all, as was indicated on this score in a memorandum of the U.S. embassy, "any preservation of deployed SS-24 ICBMs after the seven-year period of cutbacks under the START treaty would be in contradiction to the obligations of Ukraine, whether those missiles are fitted with nuclear or conventional warheads," and the United States "will not agree to any weakening of this

obligation." This categorical American attitude signifies that the prospects for the creation of high-precision weaponry with conventional warheads based on the SS-24 delivery system as a means of strategic deterrence are quite uncertain.

The terms of compensation for tactical nuclear weapons, financing for inspection activities, the possibility of using launch silos for peaceful purposes, the use of weapons-grade plutonium, and expenditures for the social support of officers and warrant officers of the missile forces who will be discharged from the army owing to the cutbacks all remain uncertain in the trilateral declaration.

I am citing all of these contradictions in great detail in order to give a better sense of the tension that was present in the hall of the Supreme Soviet during the discussion of the trilateral declaration, the ratification of the START-1 treaty and the joining of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The speeches by President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetskyy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy Zlenko stressed once again the fact that nuclear weapons are no guarantee of security for us, we are not able to maintain them, and to go against the world opinion, even if you are correct, is a hopeless matter. Nuclear weapons for Ukraine, in the current economic difficulties, are almost a suitcase for a drowning man—too heavy to hold on to, but a shame to let go of.

The fate of the nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine was resolved in two hours of discussion by the two paragraphs of a Decree of the Supreme Soviet, namely:

1. Bearing in mind the specific steps taken by the President and Government of Ukraine with regard to the fulfillment of the provisions of the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of 18 November 1993 and the reciprocal steps on the part of the United States and Russia, to remove the restrictions with regard to Article 5 of the Protocol to the START Treaty that was signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1993.

2. To authorize the Government of Ukraine to exchange letters on the ratification of the START-1 treaty and to make more active the actions of the Government to reach a concrete agreement that flows out of the restrictions of the Supreme Soviet regarding the ratification of the START-1 Treaty.

What do the two paragraphs of this short decree mean?

First, that very difficult and painstaking work lies ahead. At least five treaties or agreements will have to be reached, which translate or at least should translate the declarative substance of many provisions of the trilateral declaration into the area of concrete, detailed and documented mutual obligations. This pertains first and foremost to a schedule for the dispatch of the first lot of nuclear warheads to Russia, an agreement pertaining to the procedure and conditions for monitoring their dismantling and salvaging on the part of Ukraine, an agreement on compensation for the value of the nuclear weapons transferred to Russia, and an agreement on guarantor's and originator's oversight of the status of the warheads that are still in Ukraine, including their transport to "S" facilities and plant yards.

Second, that it is still too soon to put a period to the resolution of the problem of the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine, since a thing or two remains that is not entirely clear or resolved. Although the removal of the restrictions pertaining to Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol also envisages

Ukraine's joining in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, after all, the deputies were still disinclined to the possibility during the voting. Ukraine, under legal canons, does not have the slightest right to demand compensation for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in joining the NNPT. The United States and Russia, however, as indicated in the trilateral declaration, will provide Kiev with security guarantees only in the event Ukraine joins the NNPT. So the circle closes. And only time will tell what the way out of this legal-political stalemate will be...

IZVESTIYA Report on Kiev's Nuclear Weapons Security Disputed

94UM0265B Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
25 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by Volodymyr Knish: "Not a Sensation..."]

[Text] IZVESTIYA of February 22 of this year published an article by the newspaper's military correspondent, Viktor Lytovkin, under the title "RVSN [Strategic Missile Forces] Command Disavows Responsibility for the Security of Nuclear-Missile Armaments in Ukraine." Referring to confidential sources in the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the author cites the content of an official letter of the commander-in-chief of the strategic missile forces, Colonel-General Igor Sergeyev, to Minister of Defense of Russia General of the Army Pavel Grachev.

The article, with reference to this letter, discussed the fact that "under the prevailing circumstances Russia can in no way have any impact on the security of the nuclear-missile weaponry in Ukraine and its non-sanctioned employment." This is connected with the decision of the commander of the 43rd Missile Army, Colonel-General Volodymyr Mykhyuk, the commander of the 46th Missile Division, Major-General N. Filatov, and their subordinates to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. It also talked about the "gross violation of the Agreement on the Status of Strategic Forces" signed by the heads of the CIS and the like.

The facts set forth in the article were commented on at a briefing at the MZS [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] by Deputy Minister of Defense Ivan Bizhan and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasyuk.

It was pointed out in particular that the Minister of Defense of Ukraine does not need to coordinate his actions with the head of the Russian military agency. Assertions that the command of the RVSN of Russia have been deprived of the possibility of exercising operational command and control over the troops of the 43rd Missile Army were categorized as a fabrication. The operational control remains with Russia, and Ukraine has in no way disrupted it and does not intend to do so, emphasized Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan.

The presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the United States signed a Declaration in Moscow on January 14. The appearance of this article has thus elicited, at the very least, surprise.

The fact was stated in particular that no one forced the commander of the 43rd Missile Army, Colonel-General V. Mykhyuk, and the commander of the 46th Missile Division, Major-General N. Filatov, to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. The generals, as well as the other officers, did this entirely voluntarily. Assertions of some gross violation of the agreement on the status of the strategic forces were categorized as untrue, because CIS strategic forces do not exist. As Colonel-General I. Buzhan reported, Russia unilaterally subordinated all of the units of the Strategic Missile Forces to itself in the summer of 1992. It is thus impossible to violate an agreement on something that does not exist.

The manpower levels of the units of the 43rd Army are at 85 percent for officers and almost 100 percent for conscript servicemen. The high-quality officer corps thus permits the complete fulfillment of the tasks of combat duty and the maintenance of nuclear security.

The press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine made a statement with regard to this feature that emphasized, in particular, the steadfast upholding by our country of all international agreements signed by it.

Russian Media Endangering Nuclear Warhead Transportations

LD1003212094 Kiev UT-1 Television Network
in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 10 Mar 94

[No video available]

[Text] Here is some information we have received from Ukraine's Ministry of Defense. It is a statement with the following content:

Recently Russia's mass media, in particular Interfax and the SEGODNYA newspaper have been circulating information about the dispatch from Ukraine's territory of special trains carrying nuclear warheads which are to be handed over to the Russian side in accordance with Ukraine's international obligations. At the same time, with reference to informed sources in the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense, data of a strictly confidential nature is being broadcast.

The ease with which some journalists, referring to the Russian military, disseminate information throughout the world on the times, dates, and destinations of the trains carrying nuclear warheads evokes surprise, especially as Russian specialists cannot but acknowledge the fact that such actions create a real threat to the safety of the transportation of nuclear warheads.

Ukraine's Ministry of Defense Press Service states that such actions are provocative and inadmissible because they are directed at creating a new spiral of tension around Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. Because of the lack of discipline among Russian information sources, Ukraine is now forced to make additional adjustments to the schedule and routes for the transportation of nuclear warheads.

FRANCE

National Assembly Welcomes Defense White Paper

BR0403132094 Paris *LE FIGARO* in French 4 Mar 94 p8

[Patrice-Henry Desaubliaux report: "Deputies Feel White Paper Is Acceptable"]

[Text] With neither enthusiasm, nor aversion: The White Paper on defense published last week will not cause a dispute—at least not in the National Assembly. The deputies on the defense and finance committees who started examining it did not find anything—regardless of their political leanings—that would lead to great or violent passions.

They read the government's guidelines for ensuring our country's security between now to 2015 with "real interest," combined with "caution" and scattered "skepticism." They felt that the work of the committee chaired by Marceau Long was "suitable, honest, and satisfactory," and that the result was "acceptable." That is what the respective committee chairmen, Jacques and Jacques Boyon, said yesterday to Defense Minister Francois Leotard.

The pride of France since the early 1980's, the consensus on defense still endures. While there are some exceptions, the vast majority of the National Assembly does not intend to call into question these two pillars of nuclear deterrence and a "mixed" Armed Forces model which is based on the principle of conscription. The National Assembly also seems resolved to maintain a "significant" budgetary effort, i.e., enough to guarantee our decisionmaking autonomy.

Although the consensus is comprehensive, it nevertheless gives the impression of cracking, or even splitting apart, since there are now a great many ambiguities and reservations on which it rests. The primary quality of the White Paper stressed Jacques Boyon... (of the RPR (Rally for the Republic), Ain) quite clearly is that it does not compromise the future. "It does not close any doors," the implication being that it will not act as a constraint on the future president of the republic, who will be elected in 1995.

Debate On M5

The cleverness of the exercise appears with regard to the nuclear issue. The White Paper satisfies supporters and opponents of resuming testing. "The moratorium does not currently penalize our discussion, but they will have to be resumed," echoed Francois Leotard. Similarly, it does not bother enthusiasts of any given weapons system. However, on this topic, there are many nuances within the parliamentary majority. A good illustration of this is the debate surrounding the production of the M5, a missile intended to arm missile-launching submarines around 2010 and which, in 1992, was the subject of a decision regarding missile launches made by Francois Mitterrand. Today, Jacques Chirac feels it is an "urgent matter," while Jacques Boyon and Rene Galy-Dejean [members of the National Assembly], for example, feel that a postponement would not be disastrous.

The defense minister does not go along with the idea of accelerating this program which, he reiterated, could not have been launched until 1995. He also confided that he does not intend to give the M5 the same warhead as the M43, or to make an S5 version for the Albion platform—"the cost of that would be unreasonable"—unlike what Francois Mitterrand let it be understood.

As for the future military planning law, the deputies and the defense minister agreed to meet again, when the government has undertaken the necessary and difficult arbitration between the Defense Ministry and the Budget Ministry. Francois Leotard said he was satisfied that the basis chosen by the prime minister should be the 100.4 billion francs in equipment credits to be made available in 1994. From then on, he scarcely hopes to obtain more than a rise of 0.5 percent in constant francs. Such a result would just be acceptable for the Defense Ministry in view of the programs already begun and the new operational needs. However, at the same time it would be a notable exception to the law on controlling public spending.

GERMANY

Interior Ministry Says Illegal Trade in Nuclear Fuels Rising

LD2602173394 Berlin *DDP/ADN* in German
1505 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] Hamburg (DDP/ADN)—The smuggling and illegal trade involving nuclear materials in Germany has risen sharply.

Quoting a confidential report by the German Interior Ministry, *BILD AM SONNTAG* reports that the number of attempts to make money from the illegal sale of nuclear materials rose to 123 in 1993. In the previous year only 99 cases had been recorded.

Last year police made 545 arrests in connection with nuclear smuggling. The majority of the perpetrators came from Russia or the Czech Republic. In two cases, criminals attempted to extract millions [currency not specified] by threatening to cause a nuclear explosion. However, the investigations showed that both cases were bluffs. The report says the total number of offenses involving radioactive materials in 1993 was 240.

Bonn Withdraws from Joint Nuclear Project

BR2402114594 Bonn *TECHNOLOGIE-NACHRICHTEN MANAGEMENT-INFORMATIONEN* in German
27 Dec 93 pp 4-5

[Text] The federal government is not participating in the costs of the French test program for the Phébus research reactor in Cadarache, southern France, in which the behavior of radioactive fission products will be examined under the conditions that would occur in the event of core meltdown accidents in light water reactors. These accidents differ substantially from the circumstances that caused the catastrophe in the completely different type of reactor in Chernobyl, according to the reply to a written question from the group "Alliance 90/The Greens." The tests were preceded by lengthy and thorough preparations and had been approved by the authorities. The experimental core meltdown was taking place in a test capsule which is placed in the core of the research reactor and screened from the effects of heat and pressure. According to the federal government, the reactor supplied only the neutron radiation of the test capsule required for the experiment. The radioactive substances produced in this capsule would be discharged from the reactor in pipelines. Their behavior would then be examined in pipelines and containers representing on a smaller scale the primary circuit and the safety vessels of light water reactor nuclear power stations.

The experiment was being carried out to identify all the chemical and physical processes that are important for fission product behavior. The data will be used to test and if necessary, improve computer programs with which extremely unlikely accident courses with core meltdowns can be described. The purpose of these programs was to analyze the cause of accidents in nuclear power plants and to assess the efficiency of countermeasures. Control over the test procedure would be guaranteed by temperature measuring points which do not heat up outside the screened test facility. The project is being funded by institutions from France (55 percent), Japan, South Korea, and the USA (together 15 percent) and the Commission of the European Community (30 percent).

NORWAY

Legal Loophole Permitting Arms Deals Sealed

*BR1603131394 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
14 Mar 94 p2*

[*Skjalg Fremo report: "Ban Adopted—And Forgotten"*]

[Text] Trondheim—The amendment to the law was meant to prohibit Norwegians from acting as intermediaries for sales of arms and military equipment from one foreign country to another without special permission.

The amendment to the law was adopted by the Stortinget [Norwegian Parliament] in spring 1990 following rapid consideration. However, a formal error in its processing by the government meant that the ban first took effect last Friday.

The acting press spokesman for the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs (UD), Arthur Baste Knutsen, told us that the fact that the law has only just come into force had no practical meaning.

"Since the summer the law was adopted, there have not been any cases where this legal provision has come into play," Baste Knutsen said.

Slip in Minutes

The statutory provision, which has not been in application for three-and-a-half years after all, is contained in the law governing the monitoring of exports of strategic products, services, and technology. The Lovdata [legal data] organization discovered the formal error, which appears to have been made when the new provision was meant to be approved by the king at the cabinet meeting held on 22 June 1990. The law was indeed approved that day, and the intention was to implement it straight away.

However, this latter provision was omitted from the minutes of the cabinet meeting, probably by error. Consequently, the entry into force of the law was not announced in the NORWEGIAN LAW NEWS, Lovdata revealed in a letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Arms Intermediaries

The background to the amendment of the law was an actual case that came to light in the winter of 1990 when a Norwegian company acted as an intermediary selling arms from one country to another. The Justice Department discovered that the law in force at the time failed to give the Norwegian authorities any authority to intervene against

such activities—because it was not a question of selling arms, but rather merely acting as an intermediary for arms sales.

Kjell Magne Bondevik, the foreign minister at the time, reacted quickly to close this loophole in a law dating from 1987 governing the monitoring of exports of strategic products, services, and technology. Under the provisions of this law, Norwegian citizens must have a special approval to sell arms, while simple mediation was not affected.

The UD issued a proposal for an amendment to the law on 6 April 1990. The proposal was adopted by the cabinet that same day, and the matter was passed on to the Stortinget.

The Norwegian parliament also reacted swiftly. The Committee on Foreign Affairs, led by [Prime Minister] Gro Harlem Brundtland, issued a unanimously adopted recommendation on 3 May 1990. Odelstinget [larger division of Norwegian parliament] passed a unanimous resolution on 21 May 1990, and Lagtinget [smaller division of Norwegian parliament] confirmed this on 29 May 1990.

Evidently, everyone agreed that the mediation of arms sales should be monitored. Accordingly, the amendment to the law should have been approved by the king in the cabinet. The bill states that: "This law shall take effect from a moment to be stipulated by the king." In a letter sent to the UD on 18 February 1994, Lovdata pointed out that no decision had ever been made on its entry into force. Consequently, up until now it was lawful for Norwegian citizens to act as intermediaries in arms sales between one country and another, in direct contravention of Stortinget's 1990 resolution.

UNITED KINGDOM

Mass Destruction Weapons Reportedly Sold to Syria

*TA0703062694 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in English
0500 GMT 7 Mar 94*

[Text] French military sources say Syria is continuing to equip itself with weapons of mass destruction. According to the sources, who spoke with Qol Yisra'el's Paris correspondent, Britain is continuing to sell Damascus arms despite an official embargo on all such sales.

Suspension of Nuclear Testing Confirmed

*LD1503175094 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English
1632 GMT 15 Mar 94*

[By Charles Miller, Press Association Defence Correspondent]

[Text] The Government tonight insisted it had no plans to test nuclear weapons following the United States' announcement of an 18-month extension to its testing moratorium until September, 1995.

President Bill Clinton's decision was based in part on the restraint other nuclear powers have shown in resisting pressure to resume testing in response to China's test last October.

White House spokeswoman Dee Dee Myers said Mr Clinton was concerned about the impact resumed US nuclear tests would have on comprehensive ban talks which opened in January.

Britain, which has traditionally relied on testing its nuclear warheads in the Nevada Desert, said the moratorium extension was not unexpected.

"We reaffirm we have no intention of testing while the United States' moratorium continues," said a Foreign Office spokesman.

"And we would also reaffirm our commitment to working with energy and speed towards the completion of an effective nuclear test ban treaty."

When President Clinton first slapped a ban on nuclear testing in 1992, Britain fiercely resisted the move as three tests were planned on Trident warheads "for safety reasons".

But the Government has reluctantly accepted that world opinion is set against testing and is striving to develop computer modelling to simulate the effect of nuclear blasts.

The need for testing in any case has eased after the Government's decision to scrap plans for a new sub-strategic nuclear missile.

Instead, Britain is to use a number of Trident missiles fitted with single warheads.

Thus it is not necessary to develop a new warhead as all the Trident missiles—both strategic and sub-strategic—will be fitted with the same warhead.

However, Britain is retaining its capability to design, develop and produce new nuclear weapons in the future.

Government To Review How it Disposes of Nuclear Waste

*PM1103144294 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 11 Mar 94 p 10*

[Charles Clover report: "Nuclear Waste Review Likely To Delay Sell-off"]

[Text] Plans for disposing of nuclear waste, much of it in temporary storage at sites around Britain, are to be reviewed, possibly delaying privatisation of the nuclear power industry.

The plans were strongly criticised by the Government's chief safety adviser last year.

Mr. Michael Heseltine, President of the Board of Trade, who has indicated that he wanted to see privatisation before the next election, has been pressing for what some officials call a "short and dirty" review.

This would focus narrowly on the potential commercial viability of privatised Pressurised Water Reactors and would report by the summer.

But Mr John Gummer, Environment Secretary, is adamant that the review should cover both long-term liabilities from

decommissioning nuclear plants—costing an estimated 20 billion pounds—and plans for disposing of nuclear power waste.

A remit for the waste review, to be carried out by the Department of the Environment, has been long delayed but is now expected within weeks. The review would be expected to take until the end of the year.

Yet some industry observers say Mr. Heseltine must take a decision this summer on the sell-off of Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear if privatisation is to happen before the next election.

It was uncertainty about the scale of long-term liabilities that led to the nuclear industry being dropped from privatisation in 1989.

The waste review is likely to focus on plans of the nuclear waste agency, Nirex, for a 3 billion pound national nuclear waste dump at Sellafield—and how realistic these are. These plans have slipped from around 2003 to after 2010 while waste continues to mount at Magnox power stations.

The review is also likely to look at costs and strategies for decommissioning nuclear power stations, many of them closing in the next 10 years. This alone will cost up to 10 billion pounds. Other liabilities, including disposing of Atomic Energy Authority sites and British Nuclear Fuels, bring the total closer to 20 billion pounds.

Final disposal of waste, which environmentalists say has never been properly planned, is expected to cost more than that but has never been fully costed.

The recent approval given for the British Nuclear Fuels Thorp plant will probably mean that a lot of extra waste is likely to be generated, with nowhere for it to go.

Last autumn Prof John Horlock, departing chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, criticised the quantities of waste piling up at power stations and nuclear stores. He called on the Government to ensure that the Nirex waste repository proposed for Sellafield came into operation earlier than 2010.

It is not known if the review will cover reprocessing or dry storage. If it were to do so, it would be a new blow to British Nuclear Fuels which has just won a 16-year battle to open its Thorp reprocessing plant: dry storage is seen by many as a cheaper option than reprocessing.

Nuclear analysts reacted without surprise to the news of a nuclear waste review.

Mr. Gordon MacKerron, senior fellow at the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex University, said: "There is a clear public perception that our nuclear waste disposal policy is in a complete mess."

"Nuclear Electric will want the Government to clear up all the historic liabilities because it is clear that the City does not want to take them on."

A spokesman for Nuclear Electric disputed whether a waste review would mean delay for privatisation.

DPRK Atomic Bureau on IAEA's Inspections Assessment

SK1803092494 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0800 GMT 18 Mar 94

[Press statement issued by a spokesman for the DPRK Atomic Energy General Bureau in Pyongyang on 18 March—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] In connection with the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] Secretariat has unjustifiably assessed [pudanghage pyongga] the results of its inspections of our nuclear facilities [haeksisol], a spokesman for the DPRK Atomic Energy General Bureau [chongguk] has released the following press statement [tamhwa]:

Press statement by a spokesman for the DPRK Atomic Energy General Bureau.

According to the 25 February letter of agreement at the DPRK-U.S. contact in New York, we received inspections from the IAEA for ensuring the continuity of safeguards on 1-15 March.

The recent inspections were designed to purely ensure the continuity of safeguards [sunsu tamboui yonoksongsul pojanghanunde] in conformity with the special status [tuk-suhan chiwi] in which our country had temporarily suspended the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

In the negotiations in Vienna with us on 15 February, the agency's Secretariat admitted that the inspections were for ensuring the continuity of safeguards and agreed on the scope of such inspections.

Therefore, throughout the period after we received the inspection team, out of a desire to sincerely implement the DPRK-U.S. agreement and the agreement between us and the IAEA, we allowed all activities necessary to ensure the continuity of safeguards and positively cooperated with the inspection team's work. As a result, the agency's inspection team was able to satisfactorily carry out all activities pointed out in the 15 February Vienna agreement, including replacing and maintaining [chongbi] sealing and surveillance devices [pongswae mit kamjisudan], examining inventories [chaegoryang], examining [komto] various documents, verifying design information [solgye tongbo], and obtaining and measuring samples [siryo chaechwi mit chukch'ig].

Nevertheless, during the period of the recent inspections, the agency's Secretariat and the inspection team unilaterally insisted that the inspections were not inspections for ensuring the continuity of safeguards but inspections under the safeguards accord. And, quite contrary to the 15 February Vienna agreement, they put forth an unreasonable request for inspections saying that this is almost tantamount to regular and irregular inspections [chinan iwl sibol wien habui naeyonggwanun simhui ogunnage chonggi mit pижонги sachare matmongnun murihan yogurul tulgo nawatta].

Not keeping with the Vienna agreement, the IAEA Secretariat gave directions [chiryong] to the inspection team, and taking the inspection team's incorrect report [kurredtoen pogo] as an established fact, it insisted on unfair demands, including the issues of extracting samples from places where seals, which are locking devices, remained untouched; gamma measuring of all parts, not selected spots; and

checking of the cooling system, which was not even mentioned in the Vienna negotiations.

The IAEA Secretariat continued to intimidate us by sending three telex messages saying if its demands were not fulfilled, it would report to the Board of Governors that it could not confirm nuclear materials were not used for other purposes.

On the other hand, when the members of the inspection team in our country could not make any more objections to the administrators' logical explanation regarding the extraction of samples from places where seals were maintained, they made an excuse that they had no choice but to carry out the task [extracting samples] because it was assigned by the IAEA Secretariat. Even after personally confirming that the seals they put themselves in August 1993 remained untouched, they made an absurd assertion that they could not trust the seals because they were over a year old.

The IAEA Secretariat's unfair demands, including the sample extraction from the inlet measurement tank [ipku kyeryang tank] locked by IAEA's seals, have nothing to do with the objective and nature of the inspection—which was to check that no nuclear activities had been carried out—but are a grave violation [omjunguhan wiban] of the agreement reached in Vienna on 15 February.

We have even shown a good intention by flexibly carrying out the IAEA's unreasonable [murihan] demands, including the issues of extracting samples from some places where sealing devices are installed and measuring gamma from all necessary places. Since it is so, the recent nuclear inspection activities carried out by a IAEA inspection team are sufficient to confirm that nuclear materials from our nuclear facilities are not used for other purposes and to firmly ensure the continuity of safeguards.

In fact, these facilities were blocked doubly and triply as the gate of the radiochemical laboratory and major processes [kongjung] were frozen [tonggyol] with numerous seals, surveillance cameras, and marks of the IAEA.

Nonetheless, the IAEA Secretariat, even before analyzing the results of the inspections, made an unjust assessment that it cannot guarantee that nuclear materials were not used for other purpose at these facilities because some inspection activities were restricted at the radiochemical laboratory, even though many inspection activities were carried out in accordance with the Vienna agreement. In connection with this, the IAEA is causing a stir that it will convene a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.

This is an utterly unjust act of openly turning over the agreement reached with the United States and with the IAEA on ensuring the continuity of safeguards, and can never be justified under any circumstances.

All these facts prove that the IAEA Secretariat attempts to widen the scope of unjustice and, under the U.S. manipulation, invariably pursues sinister political aims to crush [apsal] us.

If the IAEA Secretariat truly hopes for a fair solution of our nuclear problem, it should withdraw its unjust hasty assessment on the results of the recent inspections.

We will watch the attitude the IAEA Secretariat will assume at the upcoming Board of Governors meeting. Based on this, we will judge whether it intends to resolve our nuclear issue fairly or attempts to use this for political aims.

If the IAEA Secretariat again tries to agitate the unjust pressure commotions against us by finding faults with us, we will have no choice but to respond to this with a resolute measure [manil kukchewonjaryokkiku sogigugi urirul kolgodulmyonso ttodasi uriege pudanghan amnyoksdongul polliryo sidohandamyon urinun tanhohan chochiro kue taeunghajianulsuopkedwoelgosida].

[Dated] 18 March 1994, Pyongyang

Papers React to IAEA Assessment of DPRK Inspection

SK1803135494

[Editorial Report] ROK vernacular newspapers publish on 18 March articles and editorials reacting to the assessment made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the inspections of the North Korean nuclear facilities.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,200-word article by reporter Pak Tu-sik on the ROK Government's moves. The article reports government authorities were "quite at a loss" with the IAEA report and "the trend is leaning toward the inevitability of referring the issue to the UN Security Council."

The article notes that the government showed an attitude quite different from previous ones quoting Nuclear Ambassador Kim Samhun as saying: "Our patience has come to a limit. We doubt if North Korea is a dialogue partner." The article analyzes that such a shift to a hard-line position was based on the judgment that only "dialogue with sanctions" could solve the problem.

CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,200-word article on U.S. reaction by correspondent Chong Hae-yong from Washington. Describing that "the United States is enraged and embarrassed to be cheated again," the article reports that although voices demanding stronger measures are increasing, the U.S. Government will not completely close down the communication channel with North Korea but seek a resolution through dialogue while pressing it with UN sanctions.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO publishes on page 2 a 500-word article on the background and prospects of the IAEA Board of Governors' special meeting by correspondent Kim Uk-hui from Bonn. While expecting a strong IAEA resolution against North Korea, the article speculates that the IAEA will not immediately announce that the continuity of safeguards has been broken and impose sanctions. The article expects that "the resolution will focus on demanding additional inspections."

TONG-A ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,200-word article by reporter Kim Cha-su analyzing ROK Government's view on the nuclear issue. The article says the government is preparing to resume the Team Spirit exercise and expedite the deployment of Patriot missiles. The article also reports that a government official explained that "dialogue is meaningless under the situation in which the international community is heading for ultra-hard measures."

The article also speculates that North Korea might not come to the 19 March North-South working-level contact for the special envoy exchange due to the ROK Government's drastic change of attitude.

TONG-A ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,200-word article on Washington's view on the IAEA inspection results by correspondent Nam Chan-sun from Washington. The article

reports there are various analyses as to why North Korea had not open the radiochemical laboratory. One of them is that North Korea intended to use the last inspection during the special envoy exchange negotiation or the third-round of talks with the United States to do so. Another is that North Korea really has something to hide. The article says "if the latter is the case, the nuclear negotiation will completely fall into a deadlock which can only be resolved by a dramatic change of North Korea's attitude."

The pro-government SEOUL SINMUN publishes on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Is There Any Way To Secure North Korea's Cooperation?" The editorial says it is time that the ROK Government develop more effective measures to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue. Stressing that "the most imperative goal of North Korea at the moment is to maintain its establishment," the editorial says the ROK Government should first decide whether it wants to support or interfere with North Korea's efforts to maintain its establishment in order to develop a strong initiative for the negotiation.

SEOUL SINMUN publishes on page 5 an 1,200-word article by correspondent Yi Kyong-hyong from Washington on the U.S. view. Along with an ultimatum for the complete acceptance of nuclear inspections, the article expects that "the United States will exercise various types of pressures including the deployment of Patriot missiles and the mobilization of the aircraft carrier currently conducting sea exercises in the north Pacific." The article states that "the U.S. pressure will still be based on its policy to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue."

The article also expects that UN sanctions will not immediately begin with ultra-hard ones but be taken in a phased manner.

SEOUL SINMUN publishes on page 5 a 1,000-word article by reporter Yi Sung-chol on ROK Government's view. The article contends that the government believes that the direction for the resolution of the nuclear issue should be changed now but would still like to wait to see how serious the IAEA was when it said the inspections were "insufficient" and continue with dialogue effort.

SEOUL SINMUN also publishes on page 5 an 800-word article by reporter Yu Se-chin on the IAEA view. Noting that the inspection result, which is usually announced two weeks later, was announced only one day after the inspection team returned, the article reports that "this implies the suspicion over military use of nuclear material is very serious." The article also speculates that the IAEA "was prepared" for the negative result.

The article says the only choice left for the IAEA is to refer the issue to the UN Security Council after giving North Korea one last chance to unconditionally accept thorough inspections.

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN publishes on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Wake Up From Fantasy of North Korea." The editorial says "the broken seals no doubt mean that North Korea used nuclear material for other purposes" and urges both ROK and U.S. Governments to stop mollifying North Korea because "Pyongyang will never come back to shake hands."

KYONGHYANG SINMUN publishes on page 5 a 1,000-word article by reporter Yi Sung-chol reporting that "the moderate Foreign Ministry wants the resumption of Team Spirit exercise to be announced after a final conclusion is

reached that the North Korean nuclear issue can no longer be resolved through dialogue while the hard-line National Defense Ministry wants the decision made based on the result of IAEA special 21 March Board of Governors meeting."

KYONGHYANG SINMUN publishes on page 5 a 1,000-word article by correspondent Yi Chong-yon from Washington reporting that hard-line voice is again rising in the United States. The article reports that "diplomatic sources in Washington expect a dramatic change of attitude from North Korea around Kim Il-song's birthday, which falls on 15 April."

KYONGHYANG SINMUN publishes on page 5 a 700-word article on the prospects of the 21 March IAEA Board of Governors special meeting by correspondent Son Tong-u from Bonn. Noting that the two undeclared facilities had not been included in the check list of the recent inspection, the article says that it is clear that the IAEA is conducting the inspection in accordance with "political negotiations" and therefore "the IAEA is not expected to take a decisive countermeasure during the 21 March meeting."

PRC Spokesman Denies Country Providing Missile Technology to DPRK

OW1703024994 Beijing XINHUA in English
0231 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Text] Beijing, March 17 (XINHUA)—A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today that the report of the "WALL STREET JOURNAL" that China possibly had provided advanced missile technology to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is totally groundless.

He said this when answering a question from a reporter.

Ukraine-Japan Agreement on Nuclear Weapons Elimination

LD0203145494 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1410 GMT 2 Mar 94

[By UKRINFORM for TASS]

[Text] Kiev, 2 Mar—The Governments of Ukraine and Japan signed today in Kiev a draft agreement "On Cooperation in Eliminating Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine and On Setting Up a Committee on Cooperation." The agreement was signed by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko and Japanese Ambassador to Ukraine Shoji Suezawa.

"This agreement defines specific areas of cooperation in the elimination of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, which is being closely watched by the world community," Shoji Suezawa said. Japan hopes very much that Ukraine will proceed confidently along the path of denunciation of nuclear weapons and that, as a non-nuclear state, it will join the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."

Kazakhstan-Japan Agreement on Nuclear Weapons Dismantling

LD1103100394 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh
0900 GMT 11 Mar 94

[Text] Today an agreement was signed between the governments of Kazakhstan and Japan with regard to cooperation in elimination of the nuclear weapons due to be dismantled in the Republic of Kazakhstan as well as setting up of a cooperation committee for this purpose. The document was signed by Foreign Minister Tuleutay Suleymanov and the

Ambassador of Japan to Kazakhstan. This is a comment given by the Kazakh minister :

[Begin Suleymanov recording] We have signed an agreement with [word indistinct] and the Lisbon Protocol in accordance with which we are a part of an agreement [words indistinct] weapons which we have inherited from the former USSR.

We need tremendous sums of money for which our young republic has no finance, and our economy can not cope with it. The agreement we have just signed represents good will on the part of the Japanese government and the Japanese nation who put forward this initiative to Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan and which want to render financial assistance, to participate in the process of elimination of nuclear weapons located on these territories.

The Japanese government is allocating a total of about \$100 million for all four states - for Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. Kazakhstan was the last to sign this agreement. In the near future, at the end of this month, the Japanese government will examine the matter. The share to be received by each country will depend on the decision taken by the Japanese government. We cannot say now whether these shares will be equal. It will depend on the country, on the type of nuclear weapons in these states, and the expenses connected with dismantling. [words indistinct]

Besides, it is essential for Kazakhstan that this agreement envisages facilitation in tackling relevant environmental problems in the area of deployment and testing of nuclear weapons. In particular, this relates to the Semipalatinsk region.

In the second half of March a group of experts of the Japanese Foreign Ministry is expected to visit Almaty to study the problem in full detail and meet relevant ministries and departments. This is a positive development on the eve of the official visit to Japan by our president in the first 10 days of April.

U.S., Russia Reach Accord on Halting Plutonium-239 Production

LD1703202694 Moscow Ostankino Television First
Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Mar 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov is on a working visit to Washington. The Russian and American sides have reached an accord on the quickest possible cessation of Russia's production of enriched plutonium-239 [as heard].

At the same time, it was also announced that Russia and the United States intend to carry out mutual inspections of facilities where parts of dismantled warheads containing plutonium are stored.

The production of weapons-grade plutonium at three industrial reactors in Russia—in Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk—will be halted at the end of this year.

Growing European Concern Over Nuclear Smuggling From CIS

PM1703140294 London THE EUROPEAN in English
18-24 Mar 94 p 1-2

[Michael Bond report: "Europe Alert Over Threat of Nuclear Terrorism"]

[Text] London—Security forces in both western and eastern Europe are combining their efforts to tackle the growing menace of nuclear smuggling from countries of the former Soviet Union—described by NATO as one of the greatest threats to international security since the end of the Cold War.

Interpol, the international police agency, has now set up a specialised group, involving police forces in 24 European nations, THE EUROPEAN has learnt. Border guards and Customs officers in Poland, the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Sweden have been equipped with radiation detectors and are being taught how to handle radioactive substances.

A senior Interpol officer, Hiroaki Takizawa, based at Lyon, said: "There is growing concern in European countries about nuclear smuggling. Our main problem is the lack of information. This is a new sort of crime—we do not yet know who is smuggling the material, who is buying it, and why."

Nuclear smuggling has become an increasingly lucrative business for professional dealers, but for the couriers and those who steal the material it is a dangerous—even lethal—game. Several have been caught carrying highly radioactive metals in their shirt pockets or strapped to their bodies. A Polish man died after carrying plutonium powder to Germany in his navel. "Most of the thieves are cowboys," said one investigator working in Moscow. "They have no idea they are dealing with highly dangerous substances."

Police in Germany, the country most commonly used to smuggle the material into the West, have registered nearly 350 cases of the illegal export of plutonium and other radioactive substances from the former Soviet Union in the past two years. They blame the burgeoning trade on falling security standards at former Soviet nuclear installations.

Interpol says radioactive material has been stolen from a vast range of sources. Russian authorities themselves have reported that during 1993 there were 900 attempts to gain illegal entry to nuclear installations, and a further 700 cases of workers trying to smuggle out materials. An investigator based in Moscow said: "There are wild rumours in Russia that it is possible to make money out of anything if it is radioactive. People are stealing from everywhere from waste dumps to medical laboratories."

Though there is no evidence that any nuclear substances have fallen into the hands of terrorists, and much of the stolen material would be useless for making weapons, a leaked report completed earlier this year by the German secret service identified potential customers. These included "two extremist Islamic fundamentalist groups".

It said there were "credible intelligence indications that high-ranking persons in ministries, embassies, industrial firms and research facilities" in eastern Europe were involved in nuclear smuggling.

The dismantling of nuclear arms in Russia and Ukraine over the next decade will produce a surplus of about 50 tonnes of virtually pure weapons-grade plutonium. Security officials fear some of this will fall into the hands of a rogue government or terrorist group, but they also point out that many other types of nuclear material can be lethal in the wrong hands.

Interpol is treating 30 nuclear smuggling cases as extremely serious but this could be just "the tip of the iceberg". Among cases being investigated are:

1. 250kg of uranium taken from a plant at Glazov.
2. 123 grammes of uranium stolen from Chernobyl nuclear power plant by an employee last October.
3. 260 lead boxes containing several hundred grammes of uranium from Kazakhstan. Six Ukrainians were arrested with them on the Moldovan border in December. In the capital of Moldova a lawyer was awaiting the delivery, for which he was due to pay \$1.2 million. This uranium was 80 per cent enriched—virtually weapons-grade. It takes just 7kg of weapons-grade material to make a nuclear bomb.

Siemens Suggests French Cooperation for CIS Reactors

AU1703132694 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Mar 94 p 15

[("enn"-signed report: "Reequipment of Nuclear Power Plants Necessary")]

[Excerpt] Braulage, 16 March—Heinrich von Pierer, chairman of the board of directors of Siemens AG, has suggested German-French cooperation in reequipping nuclear power plants in the CIS. The condition of the Soviet-type facilities is alarming, Pierer said at the RWE [Rheinisch-Westfaelisches Elektrizitaetswerk] "Energy" Workshop in Braulage. The safety standard is low and, in addition, the importance of safety is judged differently than in Western Europe. In some places, reactors are kept on line even though safety problems would require a shutdown. In addition, spare parts are missing and the operating crews are often unmotivated. Due to the geographic closeness, the European neighbors must be interested in improving the power plants, Pierer said.

A German-French alliance could form the core of a European initiative—for instance, together with the Swedes and the Finnish—in order to provide financial and technical "help for self-help" to the CIS. Some nuclear power plants must be closed down for good and, therefore, replacements must be established. Pierer said that in this connection, he is primarily thinking of the new construction of conventional gas power plants. In Central and Eastern Europe, there are still 58 Soviet-type nuclear power plants in operation at the moment, 15 of them are of the Chernobyl type. The Siemens director estimates the costs for reequipment at 12-14 billion German marks. However, equipment for only 4 billion marks would have to be imported; the large remaining part could come from CIS production. [passage omitted]

DPRK Military Delegation's Iran Visit Reported

SK2502014694 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 2200 GMT 24 Feb 94

[AP/YONHAP report from Nicosia]

[Text] A 29-man North Korean military delegation led by Cho Myong-nok, commander of the North Korean Air Force, returned home last week from its long visit to Iran for the promotion of Iranian-North Korean military and nuclear cooperation, agreeing on the promotion of mutual military, nuclear cooperation, an Arab weekly published in Paris reported.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI reported that the North Korean delegation consisting of experts in military technology returned home after signing an agreement for the promotion of new military, nuclear cooperation with Iran, but did not provide details.

North Korean government news agency KCNA reported on 12 January that the North Korean delegation led by Commander Cho Myong-nok was visiting Teheran but neglected to mention the purpose of the delegation's visit to Iran. The Iranian Government press made no mention of the North Korean delegation's visit to Iran.

The Western and Arab sources reported that during the North Korean delegation's visit to Iran, the two sides probably conducted intense discussion on the issue of test launches in Iran of the Nodong-1 medium-range missiles that have been developed by North Korea with Iran's financial assistance.

Diplomatic sources speculated that the North Korean delegation may have visited Iranian military and nuclear facilities, including the (Shard) missile test base located 320 kms east of Teheran.

Iranian General Denies DPRK Testing Missiles in Iran

NC2402130494 Paris AFP in English
1021 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Tehran, Feb 24 (AFP)—Iran never has and never will allow North Korea to test missiles on its soil, the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guards General Mohsen Reza'i vowed in an interview published Thursday [24 February].

Speaking to the English-language daily Tehran Times, Reza'i denied Western reports that his country let the hardline communist state to test-fire a medium range missile in Iran.

"We are very sensitive to having our soil and military facilities used by foreigners," he said. "Iran will never opt for such cooperation no matter how friendly the countries are."

Western newspapers and several military officials have charged that North Korea would test the missile, named the Nodong-2.

Reza'i revealed Tehran had turned down repeated requests from Russia to sell it US-made F-14 jet fighters and wire-guided anti-tank missiles (TOW), "despite the enmity between Iran and the United States."

The Islamic republic also refused to deliver to the United States a Soviet-made T-72 tank, seized from Iraqi forces during the war, as requested by Washington "through various channels," he said.

The general denied as "rumor and baseless" Western charges that Iran tried to acquire nuclear weapons. "Political logic, moral concerns and world realities stop us from trying to have such deadly weapons."

Pyongyang, a main supplier of arms to Iran during its 1980-1988 war with Iraq, is suspected by the West of offering to provide Tehran with 1,000 kilometers (625 miles) range Nodong-1 missiles, and to help in nuclear research.

Iran has repeatedly denied the charges, insisting that contacts between the two countries are limited to economic cooperation.

Still No Talks On Czech T-72 Tank Upgrades to Iran

AU2202201494 Prague CTK in English
1724 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Prague, Feb 22 (CTK)—Industry and Trade Minister Vladimir Dlouhy told CTK today that so far no one has discussed the possibility of exporting spare parts for Czech-made T-72 tanks to Iran.

The current issue of the political weekly RESPEKT reports that in January, Jan Vlcek, director of the arms maker consortium the RDP Group, wrote to Dlouhy to ask for his help in obtaining a license to export arms to Iran.

According to RESPEKT, Dlouhy sent Vlcek's letter to the Defense, Interior and Foreign Ministries and is still awaiting their replies before commenting definitively.

The letter also mentioned financial advantages for the Czech Republic in such a deal. The project would last for five years and bring in about \$500 million, an amount that would help rejuvenate stagnant arms makers supplying components for the T-72.

This could also "fundamentally influence the employment situation, especially in the Moravian region," Vlcek said in this letter. It would also activate the arms industry in general and open the way to cooperation between Czech manufacturers and those in NATO countries.

The Czech Republic has announced its desire to become a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance as soon as possible.

ROK To Propose Advancing Nuclear Tech With U.S. in Asia

SK2402011094 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English
24 Feb 94 p 8

[Text] The government plans to propose to the United States that Korean and U.S. atomic energy corporations advance to China and Southeast Asian nations in consortia.

Such consortia would have competitive advantages in Asia when they put to use Korea's knowhow in the fields of the construction and operation of nuclear power plants in combination with core technologies of U.S. corporations, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said yesterday.

Cooperation in nuclear energy in third countries will be one of the most important agenda items at a bilateral conference on energy and environment scheduled for tomorrow and Saturday, the ministry said.

Korea is self-reliant for 93 percent of technology required for the construction of nuclear power plant, the ministry said.

The Korean delegation headed by Kim Tae-kon, assistant minister for energy and resources, will also propose the import of energy-saving and recycling technology from the United States and the dispatch of energy experts to Korea, it said.

The United States will be represented by John Riggs, principal deputy assistant secretary for policy, planning and program evaluation at the Department of Energy.

Tokyo Welcomes French Reopening of Fast Breeder Reactor

*OW2302071394 Tokyo KYODO in English
0642 GMT 23 Feb 94*

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 23 KYODO—Japan's Science and Technology Agency on Wednesday [23 February] welcomed a French Government decision to reopen France's Super Phenix Fast Breeder Nuclear Reactor as a research facility.

The French decision was made on the basis of a report from a public hearing into reopening the facility near Grenoble which ceased operating as a fast breeder reactor in 1990.

The report said the reactor could serve as a facility for experiments into nuclear waste reduction as well as leaving open the option of using it as a fast breeder reactor in the future.

An official at the agency said the continued use by France of its Super Phenix Reactor, even as a nuclear waste burning facility, would at least spare Japan from being put in a position where it is the only country outside Russia with a similar facility.

A plan also exists for Japan's Monju prototype fast breeder reactor in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, to conduct experiments in waste incineration after it reaches criticality in April.

The plan is likely to be incorporated in the nation's long-term plan for nuclear power development now under revision.

Japan's nuclear power policy emphasizes the development of fast breeder technology.

ROK To 'Actively Move' To Build Nuclear Power Plants in PRC

*SK0303085594 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean
1 Mar 94 p 3*

[Text] On 1 March, the government decided to actively move in building nuclear power plants in China.

According to materials submitted to the National Assembly by the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, the government plans to widen the scope of the move into China after forming the foundation through technological trainings on and advisory support in building and operating nuclear power plants, aiming at the ultimate goal of plant exports to China.

To achieve this goal, the government has decided to hasten the conclusion of an ROK-PRC nuclear energy treaty, which is now being negotiated, and as well as make efforts to conclude the "ROK-PRC Industrial Cooperation Treaty," which will practically back domestic companies' move into building nuclear power plants in China, before the end of this year.

The government also plans to unify channels for this and make a single one to prevent excessive competition among domestic companies in building nuclear power plants in China and to build a complementary cooperation system. It also decided to seek methods of forming a consortium with foreign professional companies, if necessary.

If negotiations with China are being held smoothly, with President Kim Yong-sam's China visit as a momentum, it will become possible to promote this by field, such as plant and system design (The Technology and Atomic Energy

Institute of the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPOC), manufacturing of machines and materials (Korea Heavy Industries and private enterprises), operation and maintenance (KEPOC), and construction (private enterprises).

Philippine Senate Ratifies Technology Treaties With India

*BK0303043294 Manila MANILA STANDARD in English
27 Feb 94 p 6*

[Report by Marichu A. Villanueva]

[Text] The Senate yesterday ratified two Philippine treaties with India which will ease the exchange of economic and technical information and enhance the transfer of technology between the two countries.

Senator Blas Ople, chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, secured the passage in second reading of the two Philippines-India treaties, bringing to 25 the total number of treaties so far ratified by the Senate since the 9th Congress started in July, 1992.

Ople also pushed for the Senate ratification of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assisting in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

In his sponsorship speech for the Senate concurrence of the two Conventions related to nuclear accidents, Ople cited that this international agreement will place the Philippines within the protective umbrella of an international commitment to provide assistance in case of nuclear accidents.

The first treaty with India concurred in by the Senate, involves economic and technical cooperation in research and design, delivery and installation of plants, machineries and equipment and technical assistance in the field of industrial research, nuclear energy, engineering, telecommunications, agricultural and industrial research.

The other treaty with India ratified by the Senate calls for the scientific and technological cooperation which provide for the exchange of scholars, training programs and information exchange on metallurgy, silkworm culture, textile development, and low level technology which could be applied to countryside development program.

Ople said that even before the two treaties were ratified by the Senate, the Philippines and India have already put them into effect when Filipino scholars and trainees went to India to participate in research programs in agriculture, nuclear energy generation, industrial chemicals and health programs.

Meanwhile, Ople urged his colleagues at the Senate to also ratify with dispatch the two Conventions related to nuclear accident in the light of dangers it poses to mankind.

Ople specifically pointed out the presence of nuclear reactors in neighboring countries of the Philippines within the 500 miles range.

These countries, he said, include Taiwan which is 240 kilometers from Laoag, 795 kilometers from Manila with six nuclear reactors in operation and is building two more, Japan has 42 nuclear power plants, including two fueled by "highly dangerous" plutonium; China has one nuclear power plant and 10 research reactors; South Korea has five

nuclear reactors, and North Korea with seven nuclear reactors and which continues to resist UN inspection on the real status of its nuclear facilities.

Under the two Conventions in which the Philippines is a signatory, the government would be in a position to demand from the erring country, through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or its neighbor for technical and technological assistance to prevent the effects of radiation from nuclear accidents.

"The early notification would allow us to protect our people and our land from the spreading nuclear poison," Ople pointed out.

"It is imperative that we become a party to these two conventions," he stressed.

Ople recalled the Chernobyl accident in Russia where radioactive emissions were wind-carried to neighboring countries and demonstrated to the world the horrors of a nuclear accident.

International Nonproliferation Center Begins Work

OW0303143494 Tokyo KYODO in English
1346 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Text] Tokyo, March 3 KYODO—An international science and technology center set up in Moscow to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and expertise from the former Soviet Union formally began functioning Thursday [3 March], Japanese government officials said.

The center will offer peaceful research projects to scientists and technicians of the former Soviet Union who have expertise in weapons of mass destruction and missile guidance systems.

Aside from its other role as a source of funds, the center will monitor the various assigned projects to ensure their peaceful objectives.

Officials said the idea is to keep economically troubled former Soviet scientists and technicians from selling their expertise to the highest bidder, including such states as North Korea and Iraq.

The center was established by agreement among Russia, the United States, the European Union and Japan.

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